




I N F - 3 9 9 6  
 







The Scandinavian Health Network: 


























Faculty of Science 
Department of Computer Science 







After building regional and national health networks full time for eight 
years the time felt right in 2005 to do something else, and I chose to 
embark on a two-year master study in telemedicine. This thesis marks 
the end of these studies, and two years leave of absence from Norsk 
Helsenett AS. As in all aspects of life, this background has had positive 
and negative consequences for the task at hand: to say something 
sensible about how to build a Scandinavian health network. I try to 
focus on the positive. 
 
I have realized for some time that some of the technical solutions 
selected in Nordnorsk Helsenett, many of which later to be adopted in 
Norsk Helsenett, have limitations. Although well suited for 
employment in a limited, regional setting, they have scaling issues that 
make integration with other networks difficult – be it network mergers 
or connecting to other, autonomous networks. I have tried to describe 
some of these shortcomings, and suggest some alternative paths. 
 
One of the most positive experiences during this work is the realization 
that there are other national health network organizations and 
infrastructures out there, beyond a basic knowledge that such networks 
exist and what their names are. There is a potential for common benefit 
in increased contact and exchange of experiences and viewpoints, that 
may lead to improved solutions on a national level, as well as providing 
a fundament for building cross-border health networks. In this respect, 
the health sector networks may also have some lessons to learn from 
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The Scandinavian countries are all among the minority of the world’s 
nations that have established a national health network infrastructure. 
These networks provide a secured communication environment for 
health professionals, mainly in hospitals and local health services/GPs. 
Despite serving similar requirements, these national infrastructures 
differ in several aspects: organizational extension, choice of carrier 
technology, IP addressing and NAT strategy, DNS implementation and 
QoS support.  
 
Initiatives to interconnect these national health networks in Scandinavia 
date several years back, and today the Danish health network has a 
number of cross-border connections, including VPN tunnels to the 
Swedish and Norwegian health networks. However, limitations in the 
connecting technology, and scalability issues related to technological 
architecture, pose limitations on the cross-border service provisioning. 
 
This thesis investigates the differences in technical infrastructure, 
discusses consequences of these differences, and suggests modifications 
to harmonize the technology among the national health networks 
involved. Some of these suggestions may even have merit within 
national borders, as they can be seen to address scaling issues in 
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Exchange of digital data has as long a history in the health sector, as in the rest 
of society.  Although is may seem that health institutions in general have been 
comparatively slow in embracing digital technologies in medical applications, 
the trend towards computerization is now accelerating. Data in the health sector 
is increasingly collected, stored, refined, evaluated and exchanged in digital 
form, displacing paper-based systems. 
 
But what is the geographical scale of the operation? Do we need to exchange 
health data across national borders? What is the rationale for investigating 
technological options in interconnecting national health networks? 
 
Cross-border telemedicine projects have been going on for many years, 
illustrating the need to exchange digital medical data and services between 
institutions in different countries. Some of these activties are briefly described 
in section 2.6. Also, interconnection of national health networks already has 
some merit, although the history is not so long (see section 2.4.6). 
 
This trend towards increased cross-border communication in the health sector is 
also promoted by the EU commission. Their communication document to the 
Commission and The European Parliament titled “e-Health – making healthcare 
better for European citizens: An action plan for a European e-health Area” 
[EUComm04] states that: 
Increased networking, exchange of experiences and data, and benchmarking, 
is also necessary at the European level in the health sector. Drivers for this 
include the need for improvements in efficiency, and the increased mobility 
of patients and health professionals under an emerging internal market in 
services. The situation requires the integration of clinical, organisational, and 
economic information across health care facilities, so as to facilitate virtual 
enterprises at the level of jurisdictions and beyond. 
 
Additionally, the study of technology for trans-border interconnection of health 
networks may even provide feedback to the task of creating smaller networks, 
on a regional or national level. Scaling issues are relevant and worth considering 
in most cases when planning and building technical infrastructures. 
 
1.2 Health networks in context 
 
Joining of larger data networks is no new or rare undertaking. Any company 
merging process is bound to face questions concerning how to integrate the 
participating parties' ICT infrastructure and service delivery into a common, 
shared unit. With the restructuring of the public health sector that took place in 
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Norway in 2002, and the one that is made effective in Denmark from January 1. 
2007, "company mergers" may be seen to occur within the health sector as well. 
The intended result of such a merging process is a single organization, under a 
single management, where the ICT is an integrated part of this unity. 
 
1.2.1 Sector networks 
Connecting organizations into sector networks is a related activity, where the 
intention is not a full integration into a new enterprise, but rather to share a 
limited selection of data and services between several organizations. These 
organizations continue to be independent even after the genesis of the sector 
network. The purpose of the sector network is to create an arena for limited 
exchange of ICT data and services between the connected companies. Banking 
and finance have a long tradition with such cooperation, fuelled by the 
fundamental requirement to transfer monetary units between them. The 
Norwegian Oil sector network initiative SOIL established in the mid-1990s is 
another example. Reliability, security and dependability are frequently listed as 
motivation for not using the Internet for traffic exchange in sector networks 
[SOIL07, Arvidsson06]. 
 
Regional, national, and forthcoming international, health networks also fall into 
the sector network category. But while organizations exchange data via a few 
well-known applications in many other sectors, the health sector displays a 
requirement to exchange data via an increasing number of applications, many of 
which are not predefined [Pedersen05]. 
 
1.2.2 Describing health networks 
Any sector network is bound to be shaped by the sector that it is created to 
support. Obviously, the professional applications differ from sector to sector, as 
does the legal and organizational framework for the connected organizations. 
[Nohr05] has outlined some of the legal aspects that form a basis for this 
framework with regard to the health sector, discussing issues like privacy, 
confidentiality, responsibility and licensure. These issues in turn are reflected in 
national laws and regulations, which have an impact on both what kind of 
organizations  that may be connected, how they should be organized, and the 
prerequisites for exchange of (sensitive) data over the health network. The 
Norwegian Sector Norm [SHdir06] may serve as an example of a very concrete 
set of requirement for health network connected organizations. 
 
The Norwegian Department for Health and Social Affairs suggests partitioning 
the IT based information and communication systems into three levels 




Figure 1 Health network levels 
 
The prime motivation for establishing a health network is to provide a secured 
arena for use of applications to exchange electronic health services [NHN07a]. 
The first generation of health networks was limited to services based on 
asynchronous message exchange, like laboratory results, discharge notes, 
medical prescriptions etc. This service category still forms an essential part of 
the service exchange in health networks [MedCom06a]. More mature health 
networks additionally enable user access to interactive services, frequently web 
based access to data stored in a database, although many protocols and formats 
may be used. Example services include PACS/RIS and EHR/EPR. A third 
service category, provided by modern health networks, is real time services with 
strict service quality (QoS) requirements. Video conferencing and IP telephony 
are the most common QoS dependent services. 
 
While electronic health services for medical professionals are exchanged 
between health organizations, some directory and dictionary services are 
provided by the health network organizations themselves, and provide data of a 
less sensitive character. The underlying contents of this infostructure is 
frequently extracted from data originating in the health organizations, as is the 
case with DNS [RFC1034, RFC1035]. Other directories may be actively 
populated by the health organizations, like national catalogues of health 
personnel and resources [NHN07b, Carelink07a, Sundhed05]. These catalogues 
may be designed to serve purposes like 
• identifying service requestors and providers 
• authenticating users of interactive services 
• enabling encryption and electronic signatures (PKI) 
 
Important features in the realization of the technical infrastructure in a health 
network are IP address management and NAT strategy. These issues are related, 
as the most common cause for use of NAT is that private IP addresses are used 
internally in a network. These issues are important because they influence the 
robustness of the communication sessions transmitted across the network, as 
well as the service diversity that the network is capable of handling, and the 
ability to interconnect to other networks with a minimum amount of 
configuration and operational hassles. 
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1.3 Problem definition 
 
The main problem of this thesis is: Can a Scandinavian Health Network 
infrastructure be built from the infrastructure components of the national health 
networks? 
 
The information publicly available on the technical implementation details in 
the national health networks is lacking and fragmented. Particularly the 
Norwegian Norsk Helsenett has little material published. A survey in this area, 
covering technological platforms and services provided, will provide a platform 
for further comparison, alignment and cooperation 
 
The current level of interoperability between the established national health 
networks should be described, and the potential for future interconnections and 
their technological requirements should be discussed. Of particular interest are 
current and future real-time capabilities (QoS). 
 
The feasibility, utility and desirability of a Scandinavian Health Network should 
be addressed, as well as the requirements that the network’s technical 
infrastructure should fulfill. 
 
1.4 Main results 
 
For the first time, a description of the basic technological elements of the 
infrastructure in Norsk Helsenett is collected and made publicly available, 
together with similar features in the other Scandinavian national health 
networks, and a comparison is made. Also, performance measurements are 
executed between these networks. Both of these achievements rest heavily on 
the author’s unique background in building health networks, and access to 
human and technical resources in the health network organizations. 
 
The status of the infrastructures is analyzed and discussed in light of the basic 
functionalities that each of its components ideally should provide. Several 
deficiencies of the technology currently used are pointed out and discussed. The 
corrective measures proposed should be carefully considered, even for purely 
internal functionality improvements, before embarking on an effort to build a 
common, full-functional Scandinavian health network infrastructure. 
 
It should be noted that a large proportion of the sources cited are of a non-
academic character. In fact, very few academic sources exist on the issues 
discussed in this thesis. Also, a number of sources are cited as “personal 
communication”, where interviews or email was used to obtain additional 





The structure of this thesis is as follows: 
 
Chapter 2 presents some infrastructure components of health networks. Vital 
aspects of the national health networks in the Scandinavian countries are 
described and compared. The status of national health network infrastructure in 
some additional countries, as well as some cross-border e-health applications, is 
briefly described. 
 
Chapter 3 discusses network performance measurement methodology, and 
applies this to the trans-border health network infrastructure in Scandinavia, to 
describe a measurement scenario. Unfortunately, re-allocation of external 
resources mandated changes in this scenario, with unforeseen consequences. 
 
Chapter 4 presents motivational discussions on the infrastructure components 
covered in chapter 2, and suggests requirements in each area. Novel ideas 
include use of IPv6 centrally assigned local addresses and introduction of a new 
public top-level domain .health. 
 
Chapter 5 presents the results of the network performance measurement 
conducted between the national health networks, and offers some 
interpretations. 
 
Chapter 6 offers a discussion of the main structural, technological and 
motivational issues involved in creating a Scandinavian health network. 
 







2 Health network infrastructure 
 
 
2.1 IP addressing and NAT 
 
The original Internet Protocol specification from 1981 [RFC791] briefly 
describes the 32 bits IP address format, together with the initial separation into 
A, B and C class networks. At the time there was hardly anyone who could 
anticipate the proliferation that the technology was to achieve, and the 
dominating role it was to obtain in the market. But from the mid-1990s it has 
been clear that the original IP address space would be insufficient for the 
projected growth in use of Internet technology, under the requirement that each 
host should have a unique permanent address taken from the specified range. 
Some worry was also expressed with regard to the growth in size of routing 
tables in the Internet's core routers, but the main consideration was directed 
towards the rapid and accelerating consumption of IP address space. 
 
The administration of the IP address space is currently delegated from The 
Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (www.IANA.org) to five regional 
Internet registries (RIRs), each handling IP address allocation requests for a part 
of the globe. In Europe, Réseaux IP Européens (www.RIPE.org) plays this role. 
The others are APNIC, covering the Asia/Pacific region, ARIN, covering North 
America, LACNIC, covering Latin America/Caribbean and AfriNIC, covering 
Africa. Each RIR handles requests for allocation of public IP address ranges 
according to regional policies, e.g. [RIPE-388, RIPE-405]. 
 
2.1.1 Network address translation (NAT) 
 
In 1994 a proposal was put forward to reuse IP addresses in order to reduce the 
growth rate in IP address allocations. The original document named "The IP 
Network Address Translator (NAT)" [RFC1631] was superseded by a more 
mature proposal in 2001 [RFC3022]. It is to be regarded in conjunction with 
[RFC1918] which reserves three address ranges that will never be allocated to 
any organization for official Internet use, and thus may be safely (re)used for 
private/NAT purposes. Together, these two documents form the basis of a 
strategy to allow the current Internet technology to continue to be used in an 
ever increasing market. The non-private IP addresses are called public 
addresses. 
 
NAT was designed to let a potentially large number of hosts share a smaller 
number of network level addresses when communicating externally, i.e. with 
hosts that provide services on the Internet. This is accomplished by replacing 
the 32-bit private IP address of the internal host with an IP address from a 
smaller pool of available public addresses. This address translation needs to be 
executed by a NAT device that is situated on the perimeter of the internal 
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network. It must be in a position to intercept internally originating IP datagrams 
destined for the Internet, modify the source IP address, and forward the 
datagram on a valid path towards its destination.  
 
In order for data traffic to be bi-directional, the NAT device is also required to 
intercept datagrams in the reverse direction, changing the public IP destination 
address in the incoming datagram to the private IP address of the original 
datagram. To accomplish this, it is necessary for the NAT device to maintain a 
mapping between the private IP addresses of the internal hosts that are currently 
communicating with Internet hosts, and the (usually) dynamically allocated 




Figure 2 Dynamic NAT [Phifer00] 
 
One of the refinements described in [RFC3022] is the ability for several internal 
hosts to simultaneously share a single public address in their communication 
with Internet hosts. In addition to the IP address modifications prescribed by 
NAT, this requires similar modifications to higher-level protocol parameters 
like TCP and UDP port numbers, and was called Network Address Port 
Translation, NAPT. 
 
[RFC2663] discusses NAT in the context of address realms, which is defined as 
"a network domain in which the network addresses are uniquely assigned to 
entities such that datagrams can be routed to them". This uniqueness property is 
the locator functionality of addresses as described in [RFC2101]. NAT devices 
basically attempt to provide a transparent routing functionality to end hosts 
trying to communicate from disparate address realms. Transparent routing 
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differs from traditional routing in that IP address contents of the IP header is 
modified. 
 
2.1.2 Negative implications of NAT 
Although helpful in managing the growing demand for IP addresses, it was clear 
from the outset that NAT employment would also pose some problems. An 
important consequence of the transparent routing functionality is that it weakens 
the end-to-end principle, originally introduced in [Saltzer84] but also 
fundamental to Internet technology [RFC1958]. This principle is generally 
recognized to bundle desirable consequences as protection of innovation, 
reliability and robustness [RFC3724]. The main problem with NAT in this 
respect is that it increases the amount of state in the network above the 
minimum level that the network needs to perform its services, such as routes, 
QoS guarantees etc. “This state must be self-healing (…) The volume of this 
state must be minimized, and the loss of the state must not result in more than a 
temporary denial of service given that connectivity exists.” ([RFC1958] p. 3) 
The implication is that state ideally should be maintained only in the endpoints. 
Such state will only be lost when the endpoint itself fails. [RFC2993] details 
some facets of keeping state in the network: 
- difficulties in routing around problems 
- state in the core will tend to grow with the network, potentially creating 
severe choke points due to capacity problems in the individual elements 
- if security is included in the state then the possible trust models that the 
network can support become restricted. 
 
[RFC2775] gives two additional accounts of end-to-endness: performance and 
address transparency. Degradation of the second of these properties is the 
primary concern: “IPv4 addresses can no longer be assumed to be either 
globally unique or invariant, and any protocol or application design that assume 
these properties will fail unpredictably.”  
 
[RFC3027] goes more in details regarding the problems that some common 
Internet protocols encounter when they exchange traffic across a NAT device. 
As stated in the document the list is not comprehensive. Neither is the 
discussion of solutions and workarounds regarding each protocol exhaustive, as 
the commonly used option to tunnel X11 applications through ssh is not 
mentioned. Instead, the X Windowing system is sorted under the heading 
“Protocols that cannot work with NAT enroute”, together with IPsec and IKE, 
Kerberos 4 and 5, and rsh/rlogin. Protocols that can be made to work with an 
application level gateway (ALG) or proxy solution include FTP, RSVP, DNS, 
SMTP, SIP, RealAudio, H.323 and SNMP. It is also noted that in general, peer-
to-peer applications are even more likely to break with NAT enroute than client-
server applications. 
 
As a practical aside it may be noted that the inherent property of NAT to cause 
address collisions between hosts in different address realms has already been 
reported to give operational problems in the Norwegian health sector. 
[Lother05] contains an account of a situation where message exchanged 
between Norsk Helsenett and Tromsø municipality was impeded by an IP 
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address conflict. Potential remedies of a more general nature to such address 
collisions exist, like twice NAT [RFC2663] and Realm Specific IP [RFC3102], 
but they introduce additional complexity in the network configuration. 
 
NAT is usually employed at the network perimeter, frequently in conjunction 
with a firewall. Many vendors implement NAT and the security features of a 
firewall in the same hardware, which contribute to a blurring of the two 
functionalities. Furthermore, NAT is sometimes presented as a security feature 
in itself because the opposite scenario, where public internal addresses are used, 
might help potential intruders if known externally. [RFC 2775] points out that 
this argument is false, since it is trivial to hide addresses by suitable access 
control lists: “A system with a hidden address is just as private as a system with 
a private address.” 
 
Finally it should be noted that firewalls share some of the undesirable features 
with NAT devices, in that they introduce additional state in the network, and 
tend to separate a network into smaller domains with restricted inter-domain 
communication. But in contrast to NAT, firewall functionality may be perceived 
to have an intrinsic value, as it is widely accepted as a security feature. “It 
should however be noted that there will always be administrative boundaries, 
firewalls and intranets, because of the need for security and the implementation 





The basic functionality of the Domain Name Service (DNS) is to provide a 
directory lookup from host names to IP addresses, a process called resolving. In 
the first ARPANET host names were resolved locally on each computer by 
means of a hosts file. In principle this file contained the name and IP address of 
every host connected to the network. But the task of keeping the hosts file 
updated on all hosts soon proved to be increasingly complex, as the connection 
rate tended towards exponential growth. 
 
Following a meeting in 1982 to discuss addressing issues in computer mail, it 
was decided to introduce multi-level naming (domains) [RFC805]: 
The conclusion in this area was that the current 
"user@host" mailbox identifier should be extended to 
"user@host.domain" where "domain" could be a hierarchy of 
domains. 
 
This process concluded in the specification of the Domain Name System (DNS) 
in 1987 [RFC1034, RFC1035]. An illustration of the importance of DNS 
addresses in contrast to use of IP addresses is the following quote from 
[RFC1900]: 
To make renumbering more feasible, the IAB strongly 
recommends that all designs and implementations should 
minimise the cases in which IP addresses are stored in non-
volatile storage maintained by humans, such as 
configuration files.  Configuration information used by 
TCP/IP protocols should be expressed, whenever possible, in 
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terms of Fully Qualified Domain Names, rather than IP 
addresses. Hardcoding IP addresses into applications should 
be deprecated.  Files containing lists of name to address 
mappings, other than that used as part of DNS 
configuration, should be deprecated, and avoided wherever 
possible. 
 
The modern Internet DNS is a distributed, hierarchical database, It provides 
lookup functions on a number of different resource record categories (RRs), but 
the most important are still the A RR for lookup of a host’s IP address from its 
name, and the PTR RR for lookup of a host’s name from its IP address. 
 
The lookup functionality is provided to DNS clients by name servers, which 
come with a number of different per-zone1 capabilities: primary, secondary, 
forwarding and non-authoritative [Albitz01]. Relevant for the current 
presentation are the primary name servers, each serving one or more zones. 
Sub-zones are delegated to cooperating name servers, forming the DNS 
hierarchy, whereas no hierarchical structure is imposed on the name servers 
themselves2.  
 
When private IP addresses are used, DNS data pertaining to these hosts are 
required to be contained within the enterprise [RFC1918]. But as the benefits of 
a functional DNS is no less on an internal enterprise network than out on the 
open Internet, this usually gives rise to a split horizon DNS for the enterprise. 
The main feature, and drawback, of a split horizon DNS is that the zone 
contents is not the same on the inside (the internal network) as on the outside 
(the Internet): the answer to a DNS query depends on whether it is sent from the 
inside or the outside. 
 
Technically, a split horizon occurs when a name server acts as a primary server 
for a zone, without proper zone delegation from the parent zone. The 
consequence is a disconnected DNS system at the “kidnapped” zone, where the 
properly delegated zone is part of the Internet DNS’ global name space, while 
the kidnapped zone forms (part of) an internal DNS’ internal name space. 
 
Another DNS characteristic is the common root, where all qualifying resource 
records are gathered in a sub-tree of the DNS name space. The conecept 
actually consists of two parts: a uniqueness property and a characterizing 
property. The uniqueness property states that all relevant DNS resources should 
share a common DNS suffix, and the characterizing property states that all 
resources that share the common suffix actually qualify as relevant. In the 
current context, the relevancy criterion is that the resources belong to the health 
sector, for some interpretation of “belong”. 
 
                                                
1 A DNS zone has the same contents as the corresponding domain, minus 
any delegated (sub-)domains. 
2 A name server A may be primary for both the zones a and a.b.c, while 
delegating the zone a.b to another server B which in turn delegates the 
zone a.b.c back to A. 
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2.3 Quality of service 
 
The term quality of service (QoS) generally refers to mechanisms used to 
provide different priorities to different streams or classes of network traffic, in 
order to be able to guarantee bounded values for the quality parameters 
bandwidth, packet loss, delay and delay variation [Sørensen04].  
 
The Integrated Services Architecture (IntServ) [RFC1633] is based on an 
extension of the traditional best effort model, to support real-time service of IP. 
It requires the network to provide special QoS for specific user packet streams 
(flows) and uses a resource reservation protocol (RSVP, [RFC2205]) to enable 
the application to signal and reserve the desired QoS from the network. The 
IntServ model requires the routers to maintain flow-specific state, a strategy that 
has obvious scaling issues for large networks. 
 
The Differentiated Services Architecture (DiffServ) [RFC2475] presents an 
alternative, where traffic is classified into a limited selection of service classes, 
marked and possibly shaped by boundary routers on ingress. The traffic is 
routed through the network by interior routers that operate according to a 
predefined per-hop-behaviour per service class, that describe the characteristics 
of the forwarding. On egress the traffic is handled by boundary routers which 
deliver the traffic to destination hosts. 
 
There is also a proposal to combine the two architectures, to achieve the best 
from both worlds [RFC2998]. 
 
A review of QoS metrics is postponed to section 3.1.1, in connection to a 
description of the performance measurements conducted between the national 
health networks. 
 
2.4 National health networks in Scandinavia 
 
All three Scandinavian countries have established national health networks 
based on Internet technology. The following text presents an account of their 
extent, topology, basic technology and services. 
 
2.4.1 Differences in health sector organization 
The Scandinavian countries have a long history of cooperation, and the societal 
similarities are large. This also applies to the health sector, although differences 
exist. One such aspect, the responsibility for and ownership of the health 
organizations, is useful to be aware of as background knowledge to 
understanding the structure of the current national health networks. 
 
At the end of the previous millennium, the counties were responsible for the 
specialist health care in all three countries. But in 2002 the Norwegian central 
government took ownership of the public hospitals, and established five wholly 
owned regional health enterprises that in turn own the hospitals (via health 
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enterprises). In 2007 a similar reorganization was undertaken in Denmark, 
whereas Sweden has maintained the counties’ role as hospital owners. 
 
The organization of the primary health care also displays some differences. In 
Norway and Denmark, primary health care is a municipal responsibility, 
although many of the GPs are self-employed and operate under contract with 
the municipal authorities. Whereas in Sweden, only care of the elderly is a 




MedCom, the Danish Health Network project organisation, is currently in its 
fifth generation and project portfolio. It was established in 1994 [CFST07], and 
was made permanent with MedCom-III in 2000 [MedCom07a]. From the 
outset, the focus was on format and transport of EDI messages, but with 
MedCom-IV in 2002 interactive service capability was specified through The 
Internet Strategy sub-project. This was implemented in 2003 [MedCom06b]. 
MedCom is currently financed in a cooperative effort by both national, regional 
and local health authorities, as well as the national pharmaceutical association. 
The staff is employed at The Center for Health Telematics in Odense, and 
reaches a head count of approximately 15. 
 
2.4.2.1 Infrastructure and DNS 
The Internet based Sundhedsdatanet (Health Data Network) is presented as a 
supplement to the traditional Sundhedsdatanet, which is the original VANS 
network for transport of EDI messages [MedCom04]. A third component for 
electronic communication in the Danish health care, The Health Portal 
(Sundhedsportalen, www.sundhed.dk), mainly concerns communication 
between patients and the health care system, but also lists sub-goals directed 
towards health professionals [Siticom02]. 
 
The core of the Internet based Sundhedsdatanet (I-SDN) is the Sundheds-DIX 
(SDN). The technical realization of the network is by GRE tunnels inside IPsec 
VPN connections in a hub-and-spoke configuration over the Internet, i.e. having 
an ordinary Internet subscription with static IP addresses from an ISP is a 
prerequisite for connecting to SDN. The VPN tunnels terminate in equipment 
configured with IP addresses from the ISP, leaving the encapsulated GRE 
tunnel unencrypted. The GRE tunnel in turn is unpacked either on the same 
equipment as the VPN tunnel, or on a separate unit closer to the connected 
organization’s internal network core [Sorth03, Cisco01]. 
 
The I-SDN network uses public, provider independent IP addresses, and has 
been allocated the range 192.80.240.0/20 from RIPE. These addresses are not 
routed in the Internet, and hence not accessible outside I-SDN [Bech03]. Each 
connected organization is allocated a subnet of this range, and is expected to 
configure NAT for traffic that is routed across I-SDN, although sub-subnets 
may be statically configured on devices that are used for special purposes, e.g. 
video conferencing [MedCom07b]. 
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Domain names in the I-SDN network are registered under the artificial .medcom 
top level domain. The DNS system is detached from the Internet DNS, and 
connected organizations are required to forward DNS queries regarding 




Figure 3 The Internet based Health Data Network [Bech02] 
 
2.4.2.2 Connected organizations 
According to [MedCom07c], 50 organizations have VPN connections to the I-
SDN by April 2007. But this figure includes all the health regions that own the 
public hospitals, KMD which serves the municipalities with ICT services, and 
the pharmacy network. The actual coverage of Danish health organization is 
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therefore considerably higher: in reality, all Danish hospitals, GPs, 
municipalities and pharmacies are connected to I-SDN, and have the capability 
of exchanging interactive services over the network. The actual number of 
traffic exchange contracts in the connection agreement system (Aftalesystemet, 
[Mogens07]) is in excess of 1500 by February 2007 [Pedersen07]. 
 
2.4.2.3 Operation and services 
Operations and maintenance of the I-SDN is performed by UNI-C. Also 
included are the internal DNS service and an MCU for videoconferencing 
service. In addition, a large number of medical and other services are available 
from the connected organizations. One feature of the Aftalesystemet is that it 
gives a good account of available services, which organizations provide them, 
and from which network addresses. [MedCom07d] lists such services grouped 
in 14 categories, both medical and other, with an average of 10 service 
providers/access points in each. 
 
2.4.3 Sweden 
The Sjunet project was initiated by seven Swedish county councils in 1998 
[Malmqvist04]. Since 2001 Carelink, a limited company that works with ICT in 
Swedish health care, has been responsible for Sjunet, in close co-operation with 
all the county councils and representatives for the private care providers and 
local authorities. Carelink was founded by local, county and national health 
authorities, in cooperation with private care providers and the pharmacies. 
Carelink’s activity is financed mainly through service fees from member 
organizations, although one third of the 2006 budget was direct government 
funding. The organization has 12 employees in Stockholm.  
 
2.4.3.1 Infrastructure and DNS 
The Sjunet infrastructure is currently in its third generation. After the initial 
implementation as a VPN network provided by Telia, and a prolongation period 
(Sjunet 2, 2000-2), the current infrastructure was acquired from Song Networks 
in 2003 [Carelink04]. Sjunet is implemented as an IP-VPN overlay to Song’s 
core network, consisting of gigabit Ethernet links arranged in overlapping 
VLANs, with OSPF based IP routing between them, for redundancy and 
increased availability [Carelink05a]. Sjunet members connect to this network 




Figure 4 Sjunet physical accesses to Song core VLAN topology 
[Carelink05a] 
Only public IP addresses are routed over Sjunet. Carelink members in lack of 
such addresses are allocated a limited IP range by Carelink from one of the 
blocks 82.136.128.0/19 and 213.189.96.0/19, which Carelink has acquired 
through its LIR membership with RIPE NCC. If this IP range, or the range of 
public IP addresses that the connected organization has acquired from other 
sources, is insufficient to the number of hosts and internal network topology, 
then NAT is required for network traffic bound for Sjunet [Haglund07]. 
 
Sjunet uses the domain sjunet.org as root in its DNS tree. This domain is also 
available on the Internet, with the same contents as internally in Sjunet. All 
Sjunet connected organizations are required to construct their own sjunet.org 
domain by removing the .se suffix from their Internet domain name, and 
prefixing the remains to .sjunet.org. They are further recommended to use the 
same resource names internally and within Sjunet [Carelink05a]. 
 
2.4.3.2 Connected organizations 
All the Swedish counties (Landsting) are members of Carelink, and connected 
to Sjunet. The public hospitals are in turn connected to the counties’ internal 
networks, giving a connection rate of 100%. As noted above, the Swedish 
primary health care is also a responsibility for the counties. The implication is 
that all GPs, except a small number of doctors in the company health service 
(Företagshälsovården), are connected to Sjunet. Furthermore, 42 municipalities 
and 7 private care providers are connected [Carelink07d]. Finally, the national 
pharmacy monopoly’s network is connected to Sjunet. 
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2.4.3.3 Operation and services 
Services available through Sjunet are operated by a range of service providers, 
under contract with Carelink [Carelink07b]. Purists consider Sjunet to consist of 
only the basic network access and IP routing service, which is delivered to 
Carelink member institutions by Song Networks. The DNS service for 
sjunet.org is operated from The Academic Hospital in Uppsala. Another 
important Carelink service is HSA, a national directory of organizations, 
personnel and roles in the health sector. Technically integrated in HSA is 
SITHS, a PKI service based on personal ID cards with integrated electronic 
certificates, issued to health personnel. Other Carelink services include a video 
conferencing MCU, as well as electronic support services provided by private 
enterprises and central public institutions to the health sector [Carelink07c]. 
 
2.4.4 Norway 
In the second half of the 1990s the five health regions established separate 
regional health networks, with no inter-regional coordination. Most aspects of 
these creations differed – including technology, service ambitions and 
organisation – but each of them eventually converged into a basis of Internet 
technology. In 2003 the National Health Network project was established by the 
Directorate for Health and Social Affairs (SHdir), to establish a central 
infrastructure that would connect these five regional health networks. This six-
network conglomerate, including equipment, personnel and contracts, was 
transferred to a new limited company Norsk Helsenett AS in 2004. The 
company is owned in equal shares by the five regional health enterprises, and 
currently employs 40 people at the headquarter in Trondheim, operations and 
support center in Tromsø and branch office in Oslo. Norsk Helsenett AS is 
financed mainly through service fees from connected organizations. 
 
2.4.4.1 Infrastructure 
The conglomerate legacy of Norsk Helsenett is readily visible in the network’s 
topology. Most hospitals and other organizational units in the specialist care 
service still have their connection to Norsk Helsenett via the old regional health 
network structure. A contract was signed with Telenor for an IP-VPN service in 
October 2006 and the central infrastructure has been moved to their Nordic 
Connect platform. The intention is to phase out the regional networks as well, 
and have the hospitals connect directly to the same carrier network. Although a 
transition process has commenced, the old regional health network 
infrastructures still dominate. “Having the specialist care institutions’ health 
network connections converge to a unified platform, and reduce the number of 
transport network service providers and carrier technologies, is high on our 
agenda for developing Norsk Helsenett as a tool for the health sector. The 
operational simplifications in leaving the conglomerate of partly self-managed 
and partly outsourced infrastructures are obvious. Additional benefits include 
optional redundant network connections to the institutions, bandwidth offerings 
scalable to gigabit capacity, and end-to-end QoS in the network”, says Vidar 




Figure 5 Norsk Helsenett network components 
 
The choice of IP addressing strategy also dates back to the National Health 
Network project, where representatives from all five regional health networks 
participated. It was decided to emphasize end-to-end principles, and avoid NAT 
as far as possible. A national IP address plan for the health enterprises and GPs 
was worked out, allowing both private and public addresses to be routed in the 
network as long as the public address ranges used were officially registered with 
the institution by RIPE or other regional internet registry [SHdir03]. NAT was 
discouraged but not prohibited, as the workload involved in renumbering a large 
number of hosts in the most “unfortunate” organizations could be very large. 
Besides, municipal care was not included in the plan, as the ICT functions 
including IP address regime of such units would be managed by the ICT 
department in their respective municipal administrations. 
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In 2006 Norsk Helsenett AS entered into a LIR membership with RIPE NCC 
and has acquired the IP range 91.186.64.0/19. The main use of this block is to 
overcome some of the address conflict issues arising when municipalities 
connect to Norsk Helsenett. Two scenarios are remedied; 
i) NAT of internal IP addresses before they enter the health network to 
avoid address collisions and enable internal services to be reachable 
from the outside, if desirable; and 
ii) allocating public addresses to central services, avoiding the possibility of 
internal clients trying to access them as local services. 
 
2.4.4.2 DNS 
The DNS in Norsk Helsenett uses Internet DNS as a basis, but masks out zones 
for organizations connected to Norsk Helsenett, and replaces them with zones 
containing health network internal resource records. This internal DNS system 
is operated in a manner similar to the Internet DNS, with organizations 
maintaining zone data (resource records) on their own DNS servers, and central 
slave servers to download zones and act as forwarders. 
 
In the design document for the National Health Network project, a zone listing 
mechanism for DNS servers was included. This was intended to remove the 
requirement of manual zone transfer configuration from the central slave 
servers, but this feature was abandoned by Norsk Helsenett. The figure below is 
included primarily to illustrate the complexity of the scheme, while the actual 
procedure described is less important. 
 
 




2.4.4.3 Connected organizations 
From the inception of Norsk Helsenett AS, the organization was granted an 
exclusive right to deliver network infrastructure to the regional health 
enterprises by the Department of Health. This right implies both a requirement 
on regional health enterprises and their subsidiaries to acquire their 
communication infrastructure from Norsk Helsenett AS, and an obligation for 
Norsk Helsenett AS to deliver the infrastructure and communication services 
requested by the health enterprises. All Norwegian hospitals are connected to 
Norsk Helsenett. 
 
For GPs and specialists in private practice the connection rate is 60%, while 
22% of the municipal health services are connected [Krogsrud07]. All the 
pharmacies communicate via the pharmacy network, which in turn is connected 
to Norsk Helsenett. 
 
2.4.4.4 Operation and services 
Operation of Norsk Helsenett is the responsibility of the operations and support 
centre in Tromsø. For what remains of the regional health networks, 
management is outsourced for four of them, while the IP infrastructure of the 
old Nordnorsk Helsenett is operated in-house. Also insourced is the part of 
network connecting GPs, municipalities etc. In addition, central services and 
connections to external service providers are managed from Tromsø. 
 
In addition to the basic IP transport and DNS services, Norsk Helsenett offers a 
number of services, as well as connections to external service providers. The 
Address Register (Adresseregisteret, previously HER) is a directory service 
much like Carelink’s HSA, with integration of a currently outsourced PKI 
functionality planned. There is a centralized service for exchange of EDI 
messages, a coordination system for transport of patients and an MCU based 
video conferencing service. Optional services include access to Internet world 
wide web and email, either content filtered or via terminal server. External 
service providers are made available for remote management, ASP, POS 
terminals, as well as various contents providers, both private enterprises and 
public registers. 
 
2.4.5 Comparison of the health networks 
The national health networks in Scandinavia have been implemented with very 
little contact between the technical personnel specifying and implementing the 
infrastructure in each country. This lack of technical coordination has led to a 
number of differences in the organization and operation of the networks. Some 
of these differences may have consequences for network interconnections. 
 
While the Swedish and Danish health networks mostly connect intranets that in 
turn connect health institutions, the Norwegian health network extends to the 
individual hospitals’ and GPs’ network connection point. One consequence of 
this is that the number of connection points to Norsk Helsenett runs two orders 
of magnitude higher than Sjunet and I-SDN. 
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The service regimes of the networks differ. Norsk Helsenett poses restrictions 
on members’ (direct) connections to other networks, and the service portfolio 
includes filtered Internet services to make this less painful. This “single 
datacomm service provider” ambition is not paralleled in Denmark and Sweden. 
 
The Swedish Landstings have responsibility for large societal areas besides 
health matters, like schools and public transport, and Sjunet also carries network 
traffic on behalf of these non-health institutions [Carelinke05b]. In Denmark 
and Norway, the national health networks carry only health related data. 
 
In Denmark the use of the connection agreement system imposes a strict 
framework on the traffic exchange, and even integrates data encryption into the 
service, while in Sweden and Norway the formal framework concerning traffic 
exchange is less rigid. The Swedish and Norwegian health networks present 
requirements of a more general nature on connected organizations’ use of ICT, 
through the Guidelines for Security [Carelink03] and Sector Norm [SHdir06] 
documents respectively. 
 
The transport networks use different basic technology: Internet based VPNs in 
Denmark, MPLS-VPN in Sweden and several technologies in Norway, but 
mainly an IP-VPN service for the health enterprises (hospitals). This gives the 
following QoS status for the networks: 
 - Denmark: not possible 
 - Sweden: not implemented 
 - Norway: implemented as part of the TN-NC contract, but currently not used 
 
The IP addressing strategy differs. The Danish and Swedish health networks 
both route only public IP addresses that are not routed on the Internet. The 
implication is that NAT is mandatory for organizations where the number of 
externally communicating hosts exceeds the number of IP addresses in the 
allocated range.  In Norway, the emphasis has been on end-to-end connectivity, 
and there exists an IP address plan that includes the IANA allocated private IP 
address ranges [RFC1918]. 
 
The choice of DNS implementation differs. In Denmark and Sweden the 
“forward” resource records are registered under a common root; .medcom and 
.sjunet.org respectively, while the DNS implemented in Norway lacks this 
common root property. However, this has been recognized as a shortcoming, 
and an effort is being implemented to partly remedy the situation by registering 
copies of essential resource names under the nhn.no domain [Hætta07]. 
 
2.4.6 Nordic international health network 
In 2005 a report to the Nordic Council of Ministers [NCM05] from a working 
group with representatives from the five Nordic countries described the creation 
of an interconnection between the national health networks in Denmark, 
Sweden and Norway. The network was established in 2004-5, and is based on 
the Danish I-SDN technology, where VPN tunnels over the Internet are used to 
connect Internet access points in Sjunet and Norsk Helsenett to the Sundheds-
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DIX, which forms the core of the Danish health network. One view of this first 
Scandinavian health network is that it connects the Swedish and Norwegian 
health networks to the Danish, in line with Danish health regions and other 
health organizations in Denmark. It should be noted that this interconnection of 
the national health networks has a bias, in that it does not enable bi-lateral 
exchange of data traffic between health organizations in Sweden and Norway 
without the cooperation of the Danish health network operator. 
 
Another Nordic/Baltic initiative uses the same technology to connect single 
hospitals in Estonia and Lithuania to the Danish Sundheds-DIX [Baltic07]. The 
Baltic eHealth project has established radiology and ultrasound pilots over this 
network. 
 
HDN.eu is a third international initiative based on the Danish Sundheds-DIX 
technology [HDN07]. While it is currently in the process of seeking partners in 
10 other European countries in order to apply for EU funding, it seeks 
cooperation with both national and regional health networks “to develop a 
system that will ensure interoperability on a transborder, transnational level 
between the countries’ networks”. 
 
2.5 Other national health networks 
 
There is an abundance of information on health networks – a Google search on 
the term turns up more than a million hits. But very few of these are actually 
about health network infrastructure in accordance with the present agenda. To 
qualify as a national health (data) network, a project, initiative or organization 
should: 
- have a national perspective, with the aim to connect health service 
providers in all inhabited areas of the country 
- have a sector-wide coverage, at least targeting hospitals and GPs 
- coordinate technical infrastructure for secured communication between the 
connected organizations 
- support telemedicine applications, like EDI exchange, directories etc 
 
Besides the Scandinavian countries, the health network in England and 
Scotland are the only national health networks in Europe found to qualify under 
the criteria listed above. In England, a migration from NHSnet and the previous 
service provider (Cable & Wireless) to N3, an MPLS-VPN infrastructure 
managed by BT, was completed as recently as April 1, 2007. Among the 
changes made was a shift in IP strategy towards use of private IP addresses 
only, and employ renumbering or NAT to conform to this policy [Divaharan05]. 
Another notable change was the introduction of QoS capabilities [Fitchett05]. 
The DNS used is of the split horizon variety, and Internet services are provided 
to connected organizations via a combined proxy and NAT Internet gateway 
[Glenholmes07]. By March 2007, there were 18,689 connections to N3 in 
England, covering 98% of the GPs. In Scotland there were 2032 connections 
[Conn#5]. 
 
On the other side of the Globe, New Zealand commenced piloting of health 
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networking activities as early as the mid-1990s. The country officially launched 
the Health Intranet in 1999, which was renamed to the Health Network in 2005 
[HISAC06]. Health institutions etc connect via one of two virtual provider 
networks operating and linked nationally, to gain access to the National Health 
Index, databases, administrative systems and other services. According to one of 
these providers, more than 70% of New Zealand’s GPs use their RSD service3 
to make referrals to hospitals and specialists [HealthLink02]. 
 
Australia has established the HealthConnect programme, where the Australian 
Government is investing $128 million over four years to implement “a major 
platform for reforming health care delivery in Australia”. Although according to 
its FAQ pages on the Internet, “HealthConnect is neither a data repository nor a 
network” [HCFAQ07], it includes the Broadband for Health program, “to 
support the uptake of broadband services in General Practices and Aboriginal 
Community Controlled Health Services (ACCHS) nationwide”. Supported 
services include Medicare Australia, clinical messaging and HealthConnect 
electronic health records initiatives [AG-DHA06]. 
 
2.5.1 Countries without national health networks 
After spending some time investigating which countries have established a 
national health network infrastructure according to the criteria listed above, it 
seems clear that most countries have not. However, the task of presenting an up-
to-date account of even the countries that come closest is difficult, given the 
abundance of information available on “health networks” and the fact that most 
of this information does not concern infrastructure at all. Therefore, the 
following is not written under an ambition to a present an exhaustive survey of 
health network status in all countries. 
 
The WHO’s Global Observatory for e-health has recently reported on its first 
global survey on e-health [WHO06], in which infrastructure was one of the 
seven thematic areas addressed. Unfortunately, the presentation makes no 
contribution to assessing the status of health network infrastructure development 
in each country. E.g. there is no mention of a national health network 
infrastructure in the entry on Denmark, although the nationwide web-based 
health portal is described in positive terms. Also, the enclosed list of WHO 
member states and associate members shows that only 112 of 194 members 
responded. 
 
At an HDN.eu pre-project meeting in Copenhagen in January 2007 [HDN07], 
some representatives presented the health network status of their countries. One 
conclusion is that the countries Finland, Lithuania, Serbia, Spain and 
Germany do not have national health networks operational. Iceland, which 
together with the Scandinavian countries and Finland is included in the 
previously mentioned report on e-health to the Nordic Council of Ministers 
from 2005 [NCM05], has a strategy to have a health care network fully 
operational by the end of 2006. The current status of this ambition is not 
confirmed. 
                                                
3 Referrals, Patient Status Reports and Discharge Summaries 
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In USA, a report from The President’s Information Technology Advisory 
Committee aims at modernizing the nation’s health care through use of ICT 
[PITAC04], The report proposes a framework for a 21st century health care 
information infrastructure, in which one of the four focus points is a “secure, 
private, interoperable, electronic health information exchange”. The report lists 
12 recommendations, including a suggestion to promote securely encrypted, 
inexpensive Internet connections instead of “expensive, largely obsolete 
communication links”. Also, regulatory impediments to e-mail communication 
between willing patients and their caregivers should be removed. 
 
Neighbouring Canada established a National Collaborating Centre for 
Infrastructure, Info-Structure and New Tools Development in 2004 
[CDNNCC07], but the centre’s achievements after its establishment are not well 
publicized. The general impression is that infrastructure is not high on the list 
when the term “health network” is on the agenda. E.g. according to the link 
“Government Health Partners” on the Public Health Agency of Canada’s web 
site “The Canadian Health Network is a national, bi-lingual Internet-based 
health information service funded by the Public Health Agency of Canada” 
[PHAoC07]. 
 
2.6 Cross-border e-health 
 
There exist a number of telemedicine experiments, projects and activities that 
involve participants in two or more countries. Some are rather spectacular, like 
the Lindbergh operation mentioned in section 4.2.3, while others are more 
modest in their public display. Some seem to be aimed at “proving” that cross-
border medical cooperation and exchange of medical information is possible, 
while others promote cases from a sensibility perspective, where such exchange 
has a potential for economic savings and service delivery improvements 
compared to current status. It seems natural to focus on the latter category here. 
 
One of the most experienced participants on the international e-health arena is 
MedCom, with a history of such activities that dates back to 1996 
[MedCom07f]. The list of international e-health initiatives that MedCom is 
involved in includes the current Nordic health network, the eBaltic project and 
the HDN.eu initiative mentioned above. The infrastructure established by the 
eBaltic project is used for teleradiology between a Danish hospital and two 
hospitals in the Baltics, and for teleultrasound between a Swedish and a 
Norwegian hospital [Wanscher07]. 
 
Historically, teleradiology has been one of the driving forces in implementing 
health networks within national borders. On the international arena there are 
several accounts of hospitals purchasing teleradiology services from TMC in 
Barcelona, http://www.telemedicineclinic.com/. Two Swedish hospitals (in 
Borås and Sollefteå) established a connection to TMC in March 2003 
[DGINFSO06], and the TMC web site claims that the company is the only 
teleradiology service provider with an established connection to NHSnet in the 
UK and Sjunet in Sweden. There is also a report on two hospitals in Mid-
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Norway (in Namsos and Levanger), that established a connection to TMC in 
2004 [Bergstrøm04], but the arrangement was later terminated for non-technical 
reasons [Skjetne07]. According to a presentation by TMC CTO Johnny 
Eriksson at Röntgenveckan 2006, their client list also includes hospitals in 
England, Stord Hospital in Norway and several more in Sweden [Eriksson07]. 
 
An example of cross-border exchange of medical information (and indeed of 
human organs) in another medical genre is the Eurotransplant International 
Foundation (http://www.eurotransplant.nl). The organization is responsible for 
the mediation and allocation of organ donation procedures in Austria, Belgium, 
Germany, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Slovenia and Croatia. In addition to 
telephone and fax, remote system access to the so-called donor procedure 
applications is used [Slot07]. 
 
Health-related tele-education projects across national borders are numerous. The 
Pacific Open Learning Health Net (http://polhn.org) may serve as an example of 
a rather broad curriculum through distance education in the Pacific Islands. 
Another example, with a considerably more specialized focus, is a series of 
second opinion consultations in telepathology, conducted between the 










The task of network performance measurements is an activity undertaken by a 
wide range of actors, and with differing perspectives. Researchers on network 
protocols measure network performance, and use the findings to characterize 
and compare their implementations. Internet researchers measure performance 
to investigate the long-term development of international connectivity 
[Cottrell02]. Network architects measure performance to verify the 
characteristics of newly acquired network links or accesses before they are put 
into production use. Network managers measure performance in “live” 
networks to help pinpoint error situations or to assess available resources in 
order to plan upgrades. And network users measure network performance 
between end systems to find out whether the network connection is able to 
deliver the performance that their application requires [Uninett06]. A related 
activity of system reliability measurements is frequently performed 
concurrently, but will not be elaborated in the current context [XIWT98]. 
 
3.1.1 Metrics 
Although the focus, motives and abilities of the personnel performing the 
measurements may differ, the performance measurement activity is in general 
aimed at establishing the magnitude, measured over some time period, of one or 
more of the network metrics throughput, loss rate, delay and delay variations. 
How these metrics influence real-time applications is discussed in section 4.2.3. 
 
Without any specific application in mind, it is realistic to test for two common 
traffic patterns, which are shared by a number of applications. These traffic 
patterns also represent some of the most demanding loads on networks in terms 
of resource allocation and fair use. TCP [RFC793], as a connection oriented, 
sliding window protocol, employs flow control mechanisms to utilize the 
maximum bandwidth available to have an error-free copy of an amount of data 
transported from a sender to a receiver in the shortest possible time frame. The 
amount of digital data delivered per time unit is the throughput of the network 
path4 between the two nodes, and is measured in bits per second (bps). 
 
Another important characteristic is the loss rate, which is the ratio of packets 
sent but not received, to the total number of packets sent, for a time interval, 
over a network path. Data packets in transmission may be discarded for several 
reasons. Network congestion occurs when a transmission buffer in a router is 
filled to capacity, and even more data packets are being routed towards the 
resource (link) that the buffer is queueing for, causing the excess packets to be 
discarded, Bit errors in packets may be detected by checksum verification 
                                                
4 A network path is by definition unidirectional [RFC2330]. 
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procedures in the transmission equipment or by the end system, causing packet 
drop. Even IP time-to-live header field decremented to zero may cause packet 
loss, e.g. due to IP routing loops, in which case the loss rate is most likely 100% 
until the situation is corrected. 
 
It is however important to realize that a certain loss rate is normal in a IP data 
network: the flow control mechanism in TCP is based on detection of packet 
loss, and retransmission of the dropped packet(s) at a slower pace. The loss rate 
becomes significant in its own right when considering protocols without 
inherent retransmission mechanisms, e.g. UDP [RFC768]. UDP is increasingly 
used in conjunction with RTP [RFC1889] to transmit real time audio and video, 
where any loss rate significantly above 0% is experienced as a reduction in 
service quality. A more stringent account of a packet loss metric in IP networks 
is presented in [RFC2680]. 
 
Network delay in general refers to the one-way delay along a network path, and 
denotes the time interval from the first bit of the packet hits the wire, until the 
last bit of the packet is received. The term round-trip delay (or round-trip time, 
RTT) is used for the sum of the delays in both directions. The RTT is not 
necessarily a sum of two equal parts, as asymmetric routing will cause different 
paths to be traversed for data packets in each direction. Also, even when the two 
paths are symmetric, they may have different performance characteristics due to 
asymmetric queueing. A more stringent account of a round-trip delay metric in 
IP networks is presented in [RFC2681]. 
 
The delay variation is usually interpreted to be the maximum difference in 
delay between any two packets in a stream, in a specific interval. One important 
use of it is to determine the minimum size of the play-out buffer in audio and 
video applications. The delay variation metric is sometimes called jitter, 
although this term has a slightly different meaning in telecom than in datacom. 
A more stringent account of a delay variation metric in IP networks is presented 
in [RFC3393]. 
 
The ITU-T standard G.114 recommends 150 ms as the maximum one-way 
delay for “good” interactivity [ITU00]. An extension of these recommendations 
to include (one-way) jitter and packet loss is proposed in [Calyam05]. The ITU 
has also recently completed a more comprehensive work, with definitions of IP 
packet transfer performance parameters [ITU06a] and specification of six 
different QoS classes based on various IP applications [ITU06b]. 
 
Table 1 Network metric categorization [Calyam05] 
 Good  Acceptable  Poor  
Delay 0ms-150ms 150ms-300ms >300ms 
Jitter 0ms-20ms 20ms-50ms >50ms 
Loss 0%-0.5% 0.5%-1.5% >1.5% 
 
Streams of related packets may be routed across different paths, due to 
topological redundancy in the network. As this paths may display different 
delay characteristics, the ordering of the packets may be different when received 
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compared to when they were sent. This out-of-order delivery rate is 
occasionally included as a separate QoS parameter, although the consequences 
and correction strategy for real-time applications are the same as for delay 
variation. 
 
3.2 Measurement approach 
 
Although the object network for the test has no official status as a transport 
channel for medical or other utility applications, some of its components 
obviously play an important role in official service delivery in the national 
health networks. With performance measurements there is always the risk that 
the injected test traffic will influence production services by offering increased 
competition for network resources. To minimize the adverse effect of such a 
potential “denial of service” situation, one should try to minimize the duration 
of each measurement run. For the same reason, test runs that are required to 
have some duration to achieve credible mean values, should be performed at 
hours with minimum competing demands for network bandwidth. 
 
The measurement surroundings have posed some constraints on choice of 
equipment, tools and number of test sites. As it was not realistic to acquire 
dedicated test equipment for the experiments, the measurement activity had to 
be performed with what was already in use in the national health network 
organizations, and could be made available for the thesis work. Similar 
considerations regarding the range of test sites, and the observation that test 
execution at each site would require the participation and cooperation of a 
volunteering network operator, made it unrealistic to perform the measurements 
across a mesh of sites. 
 
Based on availability and prior experience, the software product IxChariot 
[Ixia07] was selected to perform network measurements between Norsk 
Helsenett’s branch office in Tromsø, and the Sjunet connected organization 
Landstinget Västmanland (LTV.se). The tools are being used in Norsk Helsenett 
to verify the bandwidth of IP-VPN accesses as they are delivered in the 
WANDA project, and have been used for similar purposes in Sjunet. 
 
3.2.1 IxChariot operation mode 
The network test application IxChariot consists of a management console 
executing on a Microsoft Windows workstation, and two or more test probes 
which may execute under Windows or a number Unix variants, or even a 
selection of dedicated probe hardware. Network testing scenarios are described 
in proprietary language scripts. IxChariot comes with a wide range of scripts, 
most of which are designed to emulate specific application behaviour like 
database transactions, DNS lookups etc. But the script portfolio also includes a 




Figure 7 IxChariot test process [Ixia06] 
 
 
A control script for the intended test scenario is created on the workstation and 
downloaded to endpoint 1 (the master probe), which in turn transfers control 
instructions to endpoint 2 (the slave probe). The test is executed between the 
two probes without intervention from the console, and the results are returned 
from the master probe to the console upon termination of the test execution. 
 
3.2.2 Firewall considerations 
Although the IxChariot console and one of the probes are co-located in Tromsø, 
the network path between the two probes traverses infrastructure in all three 
national health networks, each of which with firewalls in place to manage 
network security. Lab simulations were performed to investigate IxChariot’s 




Figure 8 Firewalled test network path 
 
The successful execution of a test scenario depends on the installation of access 
privileges for the relevant traffic to pass through all firewalls en route. This in 
turn can only be done for communication sessions with statically assigned TCP 
and UDP port numbers, and in each of the three traffic categories: test setup, 
test execution and test results reporting. 
 
The test setup traffic uses port 10115/TCP, and 10115/UDP for jitter 
measurements when the RTP protocol is employed. While applications that use 
dynamically assigned port numbers may be a challenge to allow through 
firewalls, static port numbers are readily configured. The test execution traffic 
uses a script configurable destination port, with the same consequence. Also, 
when the local probe (probe A) played the role of endpoint 1 the results 
reporting comprised of no firewall traversals, and hence was without problems. 
But the test results reporting from the remote probe (probe B) turned out to be 
more of a problem. 
 
There turned out to be three options. The Ixia script editor offers the option to 
switch the roles of the sender and the receiver. This would make the probe A 
initiate transfer from probe B, and have the results reporting occur locally even 
when the traffic load direction is B-to-A. However, this option is not available 
for UDP (called streaming scripts in the Ixia documentation). Another 
alternative was to instruct IxChariot to have the remote probe re-use the test 
setup connection for results reporting. But selecting this option in the IxChariot 
menu system caused the application to fail after reporting a single timing record 
to the console. The third option, which turned out to be successful, was to 
configure IxChariot to use a static port number when reporting results back to 




Prior to test execution, a lab was set up to simulate the measurement scenario. A 
two-interfaced server with FreeBSD 6.2 was installed, and a laptop with Linux 
Ubuntu 2.6.17 and IxChariot end point software connected via a switch to each 
of the interfaces. The server had the software modules ipfw [FreeBSD06] and 
dummynet [FreeBSD02] configured, which enabled it to simulate arbitrary 
network delay, bandwidth limitations and even packet loss for traffic passed 
between the two interfaces.  
 
In addition to verifying the sensibility of the intended tests, the lab environment 
was useful for determining the IxChariot firewall capabilities and their 
consequences to network traffic, as described in the previous section. Ideally the 
same two probes would have been used in the real measurements as well, but 
only one of them could be made available for the required number of days. 
 
3.3 Test critique 
 
Unfortunately, it turned out to be unfeasible to conduct the performance 
measurements as planned within the time constraints of this thesis work. The 
execution of the tests presupposed configuration of equipment in the health 
networks of all three Scandinavian countries. One month before the thesis 
deadline it turned out that the resources could not be found to complete all of 
this configuration work in time, due to a high workload of other, more urgent 
projects. 
 
As a practical alternative, it was decided to perform measurements over the 
Internet without use of VPNs, by configuring reciprocal NATed firewall 
openings at Internet access points in Sjunet and Norsk Helsenett. The purpose of 
such a test is two-fold. First, it can serve as a “test run” of the experiment, 
providing experience and possibly improved methodology when time and 
resources can be found to execute the measurements via the Sundheds-DIX. 
Second, the results can provide a baseline for result comparison with the “real” 
experiment. 
 
3.3.1 IxChariot measurements to LTV, Sweden 
As the main network path of this test was over the open Internet, the resulting 
bandwidth figures have limited relevance, apart from an indication of the 
Internet access capacity of the end-point networks. No mechanisms were 
employed to secure the confidentiality of the (test) data. 
 
The measurements are in lack of a UDP component, as noted in section 5.2. 
Both this problem, and the failure to activate window scaling in the TCP 
measurements could have been avoided if the equipment used for lab baselining 
had been available longer, and could have been installed at the test site at LTV. 
However, the latter problem had only modest impact on the TCP measurements, 
as the option to utilize several parallel TCP sessions was available. The 
aggregated throughput of these sessions adequately answers the question of 
throughput along the path tested. 
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Regarding the lack of UDP measurements, an effort to investigate the situation 
in order to diagnose and possibly correct the problem was pre-empted because it 
proved necessary to re-allocate the other “lab probe” to production use as well. 
The unanswered UDP related questions, such as packet loss and delay variation 
could alternatively have been answered by employing other tools. But in this 
case, the time was not available for introduction of yet another measurement 
regime. 
 
3.3.2 Iperf measurements to S-DIX, Denmark 
Although firewall openings in the Sundheds-DIX could not be configured in 
time, it turned out that there were openings in place for measuring performance 
with an alternative tool, Iperf [NLANR05], as part of more general 
troubleshooting and support procedures [MedCom07e]. This would provide 
some insight into the performance of the established Scandinavian health 
network. However, this measurement regime has some deficiencies. 
 
Measurements are one-way only. Firewall openings are in place to allow 
network traffic to a centrally located Iperf server, but corresponding firewall 
openings are not in place to switch roles and generate traffic in the opposite 
direction. This means that one can only assume without means of verification 
that network performance for connected entities is approximately symmetrical, 
unless it is known that asymmetrical technologies like ADSL is used en route. 
Besides, it may also give a positively biased impression of the available 
bandwidth, as e.g. some e-learning scenarios use a one-to-many traffic 
distribution model with of a centrally located MCU. In such cases, the dominant 
traffic load would be out from the Sundheds-DIX, i.e. in the opposite direction 
of what is offered for Iperf measurements. And finally, the implemented Iperf 
scenario doesn’t enable measurements between two connected health 
institutions, as that would presuppose traffic initiated towards a connected 
entity, i.e. towards the periphery in the hub-and-spoke network topology. 
 
Reduced resolution. While the Chariot tool has a mechanism for periodic 
reporting of partial results, and uses this to produce a graph of the development 
of a test, Iperf supports a similar mechanism for TCP only. The intermediate 
results reported for UDP measurements conducted with the “--interval N” 
switch are the traffic load level delivered to the network by the sending 
application, and not the amount received from the network by the receiving 
application. 
 
Possibly reduced throughput in individual TCP sessions. It was observed 
that Iperf, when instructed to increase the window size of a TCP session by use 
of the “--window N” switch, issued a warning that the window size had been 
reduced to 256 kByte, while there are indications that the window size actually 
used does not exceed 64 kByte. Further investigations are needed to uncover the 
cause of this (e.g. it may be an artefact of one of the operating systems 
involved), but the fact remains that it was necessary to operate three TCP-




Fragile tool/platform. On the Ubuntu (Linux) platform that the measurements 
were performed from, individual UDP measurement often failed with one of the 
error messages 
- WARNING: did not receive ack of last datagram 
after 10 tries. 
- read failed: Message too long 
- write failed: Message too long 
Even worse, an aborted measurement would also imply that the following 
measurement had to be dismissed, as the server would report combined results 
for the two with no means of separating the wheat from the chaff. Overall, more 
than two thirds of the individual measurements were useless. However, it is 
appropriate to note that this situation may have other causes than the Iperf 
software itself (cf. [Debian06]), and is not in accordance with previous 
experience with the tool on FreeBSD. 
 
Even more serious was the dramatically high packet loss figures reported by 
Iperf. A 384 kbps UDP stream was reported to display a packet loss rate slightly 
below 10%. It does not require much experience from data network operations 
to realize that this is not consistent with the performance figures that were 
achieved with 64kByte TCP window size. The conclusion is that the UDP Iperf 








4 Infrastructure requirement and design 
issues of a Scandinavian health network 
 
A Scandinavian health network should fulfil the requirements to national health 
networks from section 2.5, but be implemented with the geographical 
perspective of Scandinavia. For practical reasons it would be advisable to reuse 
as much as possible from the established national networks, but the only initial 
restriction is that it should be functional with respect to the purpose: to serve the 




The operational requirements posed to a health network are a function of the 
services that the network is intended to carry. Although an attempt could be 
made to list all medical, administrative and other applications that a health 
network should provide transport for, such a list could not possibly be complete. 
The sheer number and variety of networked applications in any hospital of some 
size may be counted in decades. Connecting hospitals into regional and national 
health networks makes it relevant to provide many of these services across these 
networks. When the health networks even cross national borders, the size of the 
application mix is bound for rapid increase. Adding the time factor to this 
equation, and the proposition that the application portfolio is likely to change 
with time, is becomes clear that creating and maintaining such a list would 
deserve to be characterized as Sisyphus work. 
 
4.2 Network service categories 
 
Based on the observation above, it may be more sensible to turn the question 
upside-down, and categorize networked applications based on the requirements 
they put on the network. 
 
4.2.1 Message oriented services 
Much of the early communication activities in the health sector focused on 
exchange of medical data in structured email messages, later known as EDI.  A 
Norwegian example is a trial service that emerged in May 1990 from the newly 
established telemedicine environment in Tromsø, consisting of transfer of 
laboratory results from Clinical Chemical Laboratory at RST to the municipal 
health service (GP) in Bardu. The service employed modems and PADs to 
access Telemax.400 [Gamst07], an X.400 email service offering from 
Televerket that was to become commercial a year later [Hausken91]. Similar 




Although practical benefit of EDI messages was proven early in the 
telemedicine history, it would be wrong to suggest that these initial services are 
old-fashioned, and that the technological development is in the process of 
making EDI based services passé. On the contrary: EDI based message 
exchange is a primary “work horse” in the provisioning of telemedicine 
services, as is convincingly illustrated by MedCom’s statistics from the Danish 
health network [MedCom06a].  
 
 
Figure 9 Monthly exchange of EDI messages in the Danish health 
network [Bech07] 
Besides the immediate payback in terms of useful services, modest requirements 
to the underlying technical infrastructure makes message oriented services 
attractive. Email UAs (clients) may communicate with an MTA (server) with 
very modest requirements to the communication channel, as indicated by the 
Tromsø example above. 
 
4.2.2 Interactive services 
Although it is hard to imagine a health network without exchange of email 
messages (EDI), a health network based on EDI messages alone would be very 
limiting in terms of service capabilities. Paralleling the growth of world wide 
web on the Internet, browser based access to services have become popular in 
health networks as well. Web browser technology is well suited not only for the 
traditional navigation through hyper text document space, but is frequently 
adapted as front-end to database accessing applications – even complex 
applications like PACS/RIS and EPJ. 
 
What these applications have in common with the more traditional special-
purpose client/server application is the requirement of prompt response. Users 
of interactive applications expect to see feedback to their input within some 
reasonable time frame. The duration of the acceptable waiting time is no 
uniform entity: it may range from sub-second response time expectation in 
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remote terminal applications, to several seconds time lag after completing a web 
form to request a more comprehensive database operation. Although the term 
“IP-over-email” occasionally surfaces in discussions of protocol layering, and 
some even claim to have implemented it [Ranum99], the packet delay 
considerations of the concept may serve to illustrate how the email platform is 
bound to fail as a basis for providing services with interactive characteristics.  
 
The shortcomings of message based infrastructure in providing the required 
variety of services can also be illustrated by a development step of the Danish 
health network. It was not until MedCom IV in 2003, and introduction of the 
Sundheds-DIX [MedCom04], that the Danish health network could offer 
interactive capabilities to health organizations in Denmark. One of the factors 
that motivated this step was a realization that the purely message transporting 
traditional health network was inadequate for interactive services [MedCom01]. 
 
Although the interactive capability of a network is not easy to characterize 
objectively, it could be made subject of practical constraints in order to make 
concrete requirements to the underlying technical infrastructure. An example of 
such a constraint could be that the network delay between any two hosts 
connected to the network should not exceed 100 ms, measured on an idle 
network. It is important to realize, however, that in line with the characterization 
of traditional IP technology as “best effort service”, such a requirement may 
become void as the collective load on a network changes. 
 
4.2.3 Real-time services 
For some categories of applications, the best effort delivery of classical IP is 
simply not good enough. Audio is a frequently used example where “one data 
packet arriving too late and we hear it” [Chafe00]. In general, real-time delivery 
of audio and video is based on playback with the same speed in the receiving 
end as the sample rate at the sending end. This makes A/V services sensitive to 
variations in network delay, which manifest themselves in audio disturbances 
and picture artefacts. 
 
The applications’ traditional “self defence” towards such delay variations is 
buffering in the receiving end, to produce a more uniform time spacing in the 
data stream before it is decoded and played back to the user. The downside to 
this strategy is that it introduces additional delay, on top of several other delay 
categories: sampling/coding/packaging delay at the sending end, network 
transmission delay, and un-packaging/decoding/playback at the receiving end. 
 
For applications that transmit audio/video in one direction only, providing a 
service similar to the broadcasted transmissions of radio and TV stations 
(although not necessarily with the one-to-many feature of ether media), 
increased delays are usually no drawback to the listener or viewer. But for 
conferencing applications the buffer increasing strategy may lead to 
unacceptable dialogue conditions.  
 
Delay variations that exceed the correcting capabilities of the receiving buffer 
are as disturbing for audio/video application users as packet loss. A packet 
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delivered so late by the network that rendering its contents would interfere with 
the processing of the next data packet must be dismissed by the application. So 
in order to provide audio/video conferencing services of predictable quality in a 
health network, all the QoS parameters bandwidth, packet loss, delay and delay 
variation must be guaranteed by the network to stay within agreed limits. An 
account of how a video conferencing application may suffer from lack of QoS is 
presented in [Høykom03]. 
 
Although telephony and videoconferencing are the most wide spread real-time 
network services, more spectacular uses have been demonstrated. On September 
7. 2001, the first fully remote operation (“The Lindbergh Operation”) was 
performed by a team led by Professor Jacques Marescaux in New York, 
performing laparoscopic cholecystectomy on a French patient in Strasbourg 
[Chall03]. And only a year and a half later the first telerobotic remote surgical 
service was established at St. Joseph’s Hospital, Hamilton, Ontario, Canada 
[Anvari05]. Even though TCP is obviously best suited for remote control of the 
instruments in such applications, UDP would be used for the audio/video 
feedback [LeParc02]. 
 
In addition to its application in remote operations, robotic surgery displays other 
features that have motivated its introduction even in local surgery at some 
Swedish hospitals. Four units are currently operational and more are being 
considered. One of the proponents, Professor Peter Wiklund at The Karolinska 
University Hospital, lists the benefits: “…that the operator views a very 
enlarged and three-dimensional picture of the operation wound; that there is a 
downscaling between the operator's hand movements and the instruments inside 
the patient which cause shakings to be minimized. Additionally one has, in 
contrast to ordinary laparoscopy, a «wrist» or «EndoWrist» that offers the 
surgeon improved maneuverability.” [Ramel06] An increase in acquisitions of 
robotic surgery equipment for local use may contribute to lowering the barriers 
against using the same type of equipment for remote operations as well. 
 
 
Figure 10 The daVinci Surgical System [DaVinci05] 
 
 47 
4.2.4 Basic infrastructure requirements 
 
Requirement Infra#1: 
SHN should be able to transport real-time services between connected 
organizations. 
Fit criterion : 
Delay, delay variation and loss in SHN must not exceed the level marked 
“acceptable” in Table 1 (p.36) for relevant traffic. 
 
This requirement is parallel to requirements to a future Sjunet in [Arvidsson06], 
and to Wanda/Norsk Helsenett in [NHNWAN05]. A consequence of the 
requirement is that VPNs over Internet is not a viable transport technology 




SHN should provide non-bureaucratic technical arrangements for traffic 
exchange agreements and implementation. 
Fit criterion: 
SHN must not contain internal firewalls. 
 
There are good reasons for any organization to protect its assets by employing 
security barriers, frequently referred to as firewalls. This also holds for health 
institutions with a requirement to regulate how their systems and data may be 
accessed from other members of the health sector. But sometimes motivation 
can be found to introduce additional firewalls on “natural” borders in a network. 
The rationale of such installations should be carefully scrutinized, as their 
operational consequence is an additional level of agreements and system 
configuration necessary to allow the network to fulfil its intention: 
communication between consenting parties in accordance with legislative 
requirements. 
 
Section 6.1 (p.61) presents an account on firewalls’ tendency to proliferate.  
 
4.3 IP addressing and NAT 
 
IP addresses have a dual functionality, serving both as identifiers and locators. 
The identifier property is used throughout a communication session to identify 
each of the hosts towards the other, while the locator is used to locate the place 
in the network topology where the destination host is attached. Both 
functionalities have uniqueness requirements [RFC2101]. 
 
4.3.1 IPv4 addresses as a limited resource 
The claim that the Internet is running out on IPv4 addresses is not a new one. 
However, some forecasts are better founded than others, as e.g. Geoff Huston’s 
projections at Potaroo [Potaroo07]. The prognosis here is that the IPv4 address 
pool will be exhausted some time in 2010. 
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This by no means implies the end of the Internet, or that the current IPv4 
infrastructure will be useless from that date. It means that the option of 
obtaining additional public IPv4 addresses for new applications and connections 
will be exhausted. One of the most plausible consequences of this is an 
increased focus and activity in the IPv6 arena, with enterprises commencing a 
transition process. For many, even in the health sector, this process has already 
begun. E.g. with NHS, that has included a requirement to its N3 service 
provider “to develop a strategy to support IPv6 within the N3 network in the 
future” [Divaharan05]. 
 
4.3.2 Elimination of NAT 
The problematic aspects of NAT are presented in section 2.1.2. To abolish NAT 
internally it is required to establish a coordinated IP network wide addressing 
regime, where each host has its unique IP address. Three alternatives exist for a 
NAT-free network: 
1) public IPv4 addresses 
2) private IPv4 addresses [RFC1918] 
3) IPv6 addresses 
 
To get a (very) rough sense of scale of the IPv4 address space that would be 
needed, one could make a comparison to the academic sector. The Norwegian 
academic network Uninett’s AS 224 exports the equivalent of 17 /16 IPv4 
networks [Yorine07]. Assuming similar figures for Sunet and Forskningsnettet, 
adjusted for the population distribution among the Scandinavian countries, these 
three networks have a total address space equivalent of a /10 network range. 
Further assuming commensurable size with the health sector, measured in 
number of networked hosts, and considering the current state of affairs with 
respect to IPv4 address space exhaustion, the conclusion is that obtaining a 
sufficient range of public IPv4 addresses from RIPE, for a wholesale conversion 
of all health institutions in Scandinavia seems futile. 
 
The second option, to convert the entire network to IPv4 private addresses may 
seem slightly more plausible. This was the choice for the third generation NHS 
network, N3, completed in March 2007 [Divaharan05]. The number of health 
institutions that would have to renumber their internal networks under a similar 
Scandinavian scheme is hard to assess, but if we assume that the entire private 
address range from [RFC1918] is completely allocated in each of the three 
countries, with no domestic overlap, then two third of the hospitals and GPs 
would be required to reconfigure all their computers and network equipment. 
 
And even if successfully completed, such an operation could not guarantee a 
permanently NAT-free network environment, as it might be expected that 
requirements for new connections to additional municipal, regional and national 
health networks will surface in the future. The experience from Norsk Helsenett 
is that this aspect of IPv4 private address use is problematic, as can be 
illustrated by one of the conclusions from the Ses@m project, connecting units 
in Tromsø municipality to Norsk Helsenett [Abelsen06]: 




The third option, converting to IPv6 addresses could be characterized as “the 
future-proof alternative”. But it is certainly also the most demanding in terms of 
resource requirements. 100% of all hosts and communication equipment will 
have to be reconfigured. All server applications must be examined and adjusted 
– some may even be without available (vendor with) source code. Very few of 
the technical personnel have any experience with IPv6 and will need to update 
their competence. The list of expensive and time-consuming tasks is long. 
 
On the other hand, there are very few experts in Internet technology that 
question the proposition that a conversion to IPv6 addresses will be forced some 
time in the future. The question then becomes: when should such a conversion 
be commenced? The current status of IP addressing in the health networks 
makes it sensible to consider answering this question with a fixed date in the 
near future. 
 
4.3.3 IP / NAT requirements 
Requirement IP#1: 
SHN should be enable transport of all kinds of services based on Internet 
technology end-to-end, modulo security motivated access restrictions. 
Fit criterion: 
NAT must not be employed in SHN. 
 
Requirement IP#2: 
IP addressing in SHN should be future-proof. 
Fit criterion: 
SHN must transport IPv6 natively. 
 
Even for IPv6 addresses several different strategies/address ranges to choose 
from, each with different characteristics. Although NAT functionality is not 
included in IPv6, the architecture does have the concept of “private” addresses, 
in the sense that these addresses by design are not routed on the Internet. The 
Unique Local Addresses (ULA, [RFC4193]) are /48 free-for-use, address blocks 
and come with a randomizing algorithm designed to minimize the risk that two 
organizations should choose the same prefix out of the 2^40 that are available.  
 
Considering “the birthday paradox”, and assuming a truly random distribution, 
the probability that two prefixes are equal (causing address collision) in a 














Table 2 Birthday paradox values for selections of N out of 2^40 
N p(N) 
10 4.09 * 10^-11 
10^2 4.50 * 10^-9 
10^3 4.54 * 10^-7 
10^4 4.55 * 10^-5 
10^5 4.54 * 10^-3 
10^6 3.65 * 10^-1 
 
Table 2 shows that a health network connecting 100,000 hospitals that use ULA 
addresses will have a 0.5% probability of an address collision, while for 
1,000,000 units the collision probability is 36.5%. If even these figures are 
regarded as too high, a recent initiative from APNIC could be considered. The 
suggestion is to re-vitalize an earlier proposal for a similar scheme with central 
coordination of assigned prefixes (ULA-C, [Hinden05]). If this proposal is 





Among the differences noted in section 2.4.5 concerning the national health 
networks in the Scandinavian countries is the choice of DNS strategy. Both the 
Danish and the Norwegian DNS implementations have problems. 
 
4.4.1 Split horizon DNS 
The Danish SDN’s DNS implementation requires that resources intended to be 
available network-wide are registered under the artificial top level domain 
.medcom.  This is a health network internal name space that lists the resources’ 
SDN-public, but non-Internet visible, IP addresses (post-NAT). Consider a 
hospital that has a requirement to make one of its internal medical systems 
available to selected cooperating institutions. The system’s private IP address is 
mapped to an SDN-public address through a static NAT entry in a network 
device. This address is subsequently associated with a name that is registered 
with an A RR as something.medcom in the SDN DNS. The paradox is that this 
resource is not going to be available under that name from the hospital’s internal 
clients, because the IP address that the name resolves to is different from the IP 
address that the resource is available as internally. In other words, the resource 
owner cannot access the resource in the same manner as the community that has 
been granted access by the owner. 
 
Sjunet suffers from the same internal split horizon problem, although here some 
of the effect is leveraged by recommendation to make the organization’s 
sjunet.org domain be a copy of the organization’s official domain. Even so, the 
recent IBM evaluation of Sjunet presents a user requirement to have “a united 
DNS structure, where any system always has the same logical name in DNS, 
independent of whether one tries to access the system from the same network or 
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from another one” [Arvidsson06]. A similar recommendation is given in 
Uninett’s report on establishing a national health network in Norway [Haug97], 
and in the technical recommendations for the Baltic eHealth project [Nohr06]. 
 
It should be noted, however, that recommendations to the contrary can also be 
found. The US NIST’s “Guidelines on Firewalls and Firewall Policy” is perhaps 
the most prominent, where security considerations is the prime motivation 
[Wack02]: 
An organization should maintain separate internal and external domain name 
servers. This practice, known as split DNS, ensures that private internal 
systems are never identified to persons external to the organization. 
 
4.4.2 Common DNS root 
Norsk Helsenett’s DNS system suffers from an even more serious problem, in 
that the domains do not share a common root. Connected institutions are 
allowed to use their Internet domain name inside the health network as well, 
resulting in a complex configuration of the internal name space. Although most 
organizations have opted for sub-domains of nhn.no, there are also many who 
use second-level domains – mostly under .no, but .com, .net, .org and .nu are 
also represented.  
 
The common root feature of the health network’s internal DNS becomes 
important when connecting to other networks. In order to form a common 
internal DNS system and make services available across the interconnected 
networks, they must import each other’s DNS name spaces, through query 
forwarding or zone transfers. If this space is fragmented, the integration task 
involves more configuration work. If in addition it is dynamic, as is the case 
with Norsk Helsenett, then the task becomes a consistency challenge. The 
common root feature is also among the recommended features for a national 
health networks in [Haug97]. 
 
4.4.3 DNS requirements 
Requirement DNS#1: 
The DNS service should be scalable. 
Fit criterion alt. 1: 
There should be a minimum number of DNS roots represented. 
Fit criterion alt. 2: 
The Internet DNS must be used, also for health network internal resources. 
 
Concerning the number of common DNS roots, only the uniqueness property is 
actually important for scalability purposes. The ability to access the entire 
health network DNS name space is vital to enable users’ access to services 
across institutions. The more fragmented and dynamic this name space is, the 
higher the risk that only an incomplete subset of the name space will be 
available in some parts of the network. 
 
The absolute minimum number of DNS roots is of course one, meaning that all 
health network resources share a common DNS suffix. The current 
Scandinavian health network, connecting the Swedish and Norwegian health 
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networks to the Danish S-DIX, uses this approach with the .medcom domain. If 
a more neutral and descriptive name (like .health) could be registered with 
ICANN, this could possibly be turned into a viable strategy – possibly with 
ISO-3166 two-letter country codes as second-level sub-domains. An obvious 
drawback is that such a renaming of the entire health sector’s network 
appearance would be expensive, to say the least. 
 
For the other alternative, there are two important aspects to consider before 
deciding to use the Internet DNS as the only DNS system in the health network. 
One is the desirability of making all resource names publicly known, and the 
second is the choice of IP addressing strategy for the network. The security 
implications of a publicly known DNS name space are bound to be subject to 
considerable controversy. While e.g. the US NIST argue that the requirement to 
hide internal DNS data is strong enough to warrant a split DNS, others claim 
that this is argument belongs in the security-through-obscurity category, with 
minimal valid security relevance. 
 
Regarding choice of IP addressing strategy, certain IP addresses preclude 
registration in the Internet DNS. For IPv4 private addresses, [RFC1918] 
mandates that DNS RRs and other information referring to internal private 
addresses should be contained within the enterprise. For IPv6 ULA addresses, 
[RFC4193] states that nodes with only local IPv6 addresses must not be 
installed in the global DNS. The motivation behind both of these restrictions is 
the lack of global uniqueness for the address categories involved. The 
consequence is that these address types can only be registered in an internal 
DNS, requiring a split-horizon DNS installation. Consequently, a split-horizon 
DNS can only be avoided by using IPv4 public addresses, IPv6 global unicast 









As the test were planned to be performed on the network described in section 
2.4.6, the major part of the network paths involved crosses the Internet. This 
adds a level of unpredictability to the results, as the load conditions may change 
at random. Also, it is difficult to assess the causes of the throughput limits 
uncovered – the Internet access capacity of the networks involved, bandwidth 
related encapsulation limitations on the tunnel endpoints, or other restrictions or 
limitations along the network paths. 
 
5.2 IxChariot / StensPC.ltv.se 
 
A network trace between one of Norsk Helsenett’s Internet access points in 
Tromsø and Landstinget Västmanland includes 10 hops before the traffic gets 
neglected by the firewall in hop 11. Uninett (AS224) is traversed in hops 2-4, 
NORDUnet (AS2603) in hops 5-6, before traffic is handed over to TDC/Song at 
the Stockholm-A peering mesh in hop 7, and transported inside their 
autonomous routing system (AS3246) the rest of the way. 
 
: anders@bossa; traceroute 193.180.9.28 
traceroute to 193.180.9.28 (193.180.9.28), 64 hops max, 44 byte packets 
 1  ext-gw.rito.no (193.157.64.1)  0.375 ms  0.281 ms  0.241 ms 
 2  tromso-gw.uninett.no (158.39.52.1)  1.112 ms  1.633 ms  0.637 ms 
 3  trd-gw.uninett.no (128.39.47.97)  14.256 ms  14.508 ms  14.131 ms 
 4  oslo-gw1.uninett.no (128.39.46.1)  24.015 ms  22.149 ms  22.389 ms 
 5  no-gw.nordu.net (193.10.68.101)  22.162 ms  22.017 ms  23.330 ms 
 6  se-tug.nordu.net (193.10.68.29)  29.905 ms  29.756 ms  29.835 ms 
 7  netnod-ix-ge-a-sth-4470.se.sn.net (195.245.240.41)  30.612 ms  34.823 ms  30.870 ms 
 8  rif10-rs1-t4-sto.se.sn.net (81.216.0.138)  31.156 ms  30.392 ms  30.810 ms 
 9  rif2-cr1-vf-oby.se.sn.net (213.187.195.94)  31.432 ms  30.944 ms  30.958 ms 
10  rif2-cr1-vf-vst.se.sn.net (213.187.195.98)  32.625 ms  32.104 ms  32.745 ms 
11  * * * 
(etc) 
Figure 11 Network trace between NO-SE 
 
Interestingly, a network trace in the opposite direction uncovers a routing 
asymmetry. Hops 7 in Figure 11 and 012 in Figure 12 are both on “Stockholm-
A GigE”, and marks one of the departure points. The other departure point is 
hop 8, which corresponds to hop 008. The asymmetry consists of the extra hops 
009, 010 and 011 that the traffic from Sweden to Norway traverses. 
 
Node  Time (ms)   Address           Name 
(initial LTV internal hops LTV removed) 
 007   2          213.187.195.97    rif3-cr1-vf-oby.se.sn.net 
 008   34         213.187.195.93    rif47-rs1-t4-sto.se.sn.net 
 009   2          81.216.0.137      rif5-cr3-kst-sto.se.sn.net 
 010   2          213.50.65.49      ae1.kst-p1.sto.se.sn.net 
 011   3          88.131.143.64     static-88.131.143.64.addr.tdcsong.se 
 012   7          195.245.240.24    ne-gw-4470.nordu.net 
 013   11         193.10.68.30      no-gw.nordu.net 
 014   11         193.10.68.102     oslo-gw1.uninett.no 
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 015   19         128.39.46.2       trd-gw.uninett.no 
 016   36         128.39.47.98      tromso-gw.uninett.no 
 017   33         193.157.64.1      ext-gw.rito.no 
Figure 12 Network trace between SE-NO 
 
The extra hops are all inside TDC/Song’s network. But as these hops contribute 
with a maximum of five milliseconds (15%) increased round-trip time, their 
effect on the performance measurements may be assumed to be small. 
 
The round-trip time measured between the two IxChariot probes was just below 
35 milliseconds (Figure 13). A 33.9 ms RTT would imply that the TCP window 
can be transmitted up to 29.5 times each second, giving an upper bound on 
single-session TCP throughput of 15.1 kbps with a TCP window of 64 kByte.  
 
 
--- 193.180.9.198 ping statistics --- 
60 packets transmitted, 60 received, 0% packet loss, time 59002ms 
rtt min/avg/max/mdev = 33.428/33.945/34.466/0.235 ms 
Figure 13 Network tround-trip time between SE-NO 
 
5.2.1 TCP throughput 
An attempt to employ the mechanisms described in [RFC1323] to increase the 
TCP window size beyond the default 64 kByte failed, with the following error 
message presented on the IxChariot console: 
CHR0125: Endpoint 2 does not support the following function(s) required to run 
this test: Setting connections send and receive buffer size IPv4. 
 
With IxChariot, it was possible to measure performance in both directions, even 
simultaneously. The achieved throughput in each of the directions was 13.3 
Mbps and 13.4 Mbps, approximately 88% of the maximum estimated from the 




Figure 14 TCP throughput measured concurrently from and to Sjunet 
(LTV), 64 kB TCP window size 
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An assessment was made of the total throughput in both directions by running 
several TCP sessions in parallel, all with a window size of 64 kByte. In the 
direction Norway-to-Sweden, the ten-minute mean of the aggregated thoughput 








Figure 16 Four-session TCP throughput from Sjunet (LTV) 
 
5.2.2 UDP measurements 
It turned out that the planned UDP measurements, intended to investigate packet 
loss and delay variations, could not be performed successfully. The reason for 
this failure is uncertain, as it was necessary to re-allocate the local test probe to 
production use before further investigations and diagnosis could be executed.  
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The problem symptoms observed was as follows: streaming measurements 
could be configured and commenced as normal, but progress stopped after 10-
15 seconds, and the IxChariot “Timing Records Completed” counter ceased to 
be incremented after just a handful of records. These measurement instances did 
not progress further, and had to be terminated through the “Abandon Run” 
functionality of IxChariot. 
 
5.3 Iperf / falcon.uni-c.medcom 
 
A network trace between the tunnel end points uncovered that the path includes 
17 hops, and traverses Uninett (AS224) in hops 2-5, is handed over to 
Swipnet/Tele2 at NIX2 in Oslo (hop 6), and is transported inside their 
autonomous routing system (AS1257) the rest of the way.  
 
: anders@bossa; traceroute gw2.sdn.uni-c.dk. 
traceroute to gw2.sdn.uni-c.dk (130.228.4.254), 64 hops max, 44 byte packets 
 1  ext-gw.rito.no (193.157.64.1)  0.303 ms  0.593 ms  0.252 ms 
 2  tromso-gw.uninett.no (158.39.52.1)  0.328 ms  0.338 ms  0.343 ms 
 3  trd-gw.uninett.no (128.39.47.97)  14.133 ms  14.195 ms  13.981 ms 
 4  oslo-gw1.uninett.no (128.39.46.1)  21.786 ms  22.393 ms  21.816 ms 
 5  stolav-gw.uninett.no (128.39.46.250)  21.941 ms  22.298 ms  22.377 ms 
 6  193.156.120.4 (193.156.120.4)  22.165 ms  23.105 ms  22.400 ms 
 7  lba-core-1.pos3-2.swip.net (130.244.192.45)  58.801 ms  199.161 ms  103.772 ms 
 8  kst-core-1.pos10-0-0.swip.net (130.244.218.158)  34.777 ms  34.742 ms  34.688 ms 
 9  avk-core-1.gigabiteth14-0-0.swip.net (130.244.195.161) 35.205 ms 35.236 ms 34.884 ms 
10  lim-core-1.pos0-0-0.swip.net (130.244.52.162)  34.970 ms  34.713 ms  34.701 ms 
11  cop1-core.pos3-0.swip.net (130.244.206.58)  35.369 ms  34.856 ms  35.328 ms 
12  pos4-0.val1-core.dk.tele2.net (130.227.2.81)  34.726 ms  34.626 ms  34.805 ms 
13  srp9-0.val2-core.dk.tele2.net (130.227.247.50)  35.080 ms  34.897 ms  34.917 ms 
14  ge49.val-srv2b-core.dk.tele2.net (130.227.247.38)  49.236 ms  34.725 ms  34.889 ms 
15  129.142.249.234 (129.142.249.234)  35.377 ms  35.165 ms  35.291 ms 
16  knet-uni2-lgb.uni-c.dk (130.228.5.1)  35.189 ms  35.740 ms  35.303 ms 
17  gw2.sdn.uni-c.dk (130.228.4.254)  36.617 ms *  35.783 ms 
Figure 17 Network trace between tunnel endpoints NO-DK 
 
For the Iperf traffic, the number of hops is only 4, with the tunnel between 
entries 2 and 3. 
 
: anders@atp; traceroute falcon.uni-c.medcom. 
traceroute to falcon.uni-c.medcom (195.80.240.112), 64 hops max, 40 byte packets 
 1  g0-2-5.tromsoc1-gw.rtr.nhn.no (172.21.8.1)  3.550 ms  0.857 ms  0.799 ms 
 2  f0-1-1.next-gw.rtr.nhn.no (172.21.4.157)  1.695 ms  2.835 ms  1.506 ms 
 3  * * * 
 4  195.80.240.112 (195.80.240.112)  39.219 ms  38.580 ms  40.349 ms 
Figure 18 Network trace between probes NO-DK 
 
The round-trip time measured between the Iperf client and server was just 
below 40 milliseconds (Figure 19). A 38.7 ms RTT would imply that the TCP 
window can be transmitted up to 25.9 times each second, giving an upper bound 
on single-session TCP throughput of 13.3 kbps with a TCP window of 64 
kByte.  
 
--- 195.80.240.112 ping statistics --- 
60 packets transmitted, 60 received, 0% packet loss, time 59002ms 
rtt min/avg/max/mdev = 37.980/38.730/39.860/0.413 ms 
Figure 19 Network round-trip time between NO-DK 
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5.3.1 TCP throughput 
Initial investigations (with short-running tests) of the endpoints’ capabilities 
indicated that TCP window scaling [RFC1323] was not available on the Iperf 
server at MedCom. Using the Iperf parameter –w to adjust TCP window size did 
not improve throughput beyond a setting of 64 kByte (Figure 20), which is 
TCP’s maximum window size without the Van Jacobson extensions described 
in the RFC. The actual performance measured for a single session with 64 
kByte window size was 11.9 kbps, 89% of the maximum estimated from the 
mean round-trip time. 
 
 
Figure 20 Single TCP session throughput with varying window size 
 
Longer-running multi-session tests were used to assess the maximum aggregate 
throughput available between the end-systems. The conclusion is that there was 
no performance enhancement above three parallel TCP sessions, and hardly 
even from two to three sessions. Maximum throughput was measured to 24.2 





Figure 21 Aggregate throughput from multiple TCP sessions to S-DIX 
HUB 
 
The three-session aggregate may serve as an illustration of variation in 




Figure 22 Three-session TCP throughput to S-DIX HUB 
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5.3.2 UDP packet loss and delay variation 
The Iperf UDP based measurements suffered from the problem with reduced 
resolution mentioned in section 3.3.2. In order to produce a measurement series 
consisting of ten intervals it was necessary to run ten individual test series. 
Combined with the software/platform instability (also mentioned above), each 
interval in a series would be arbitrarily separated in wall time. The implication 
is that the graphs give a false impression of continuity in each series. 
 
Even more serious is the obvious inconsistency with respect to the TCP 
bandwidth measurements. A network with a consistent loss rate as illustrated 
below (Figure 23) couldn’t possibly deliver in excess of 12 Mbps throughput in 
a single TCP session. The consequence is that the measurement tool cannot be 
trusted – a conclusion that rubs off on the results regarding delay variations as 















As noted in section 2.4.5, the national health networks in the Scandinavian 
countries differ on a number of issues. Some of these issues may have 
consequences in an effort to create a Scandinavian health network. A more 
detailed account of the technological issues (section 6.2) is given in chapter 4. 
 
6.1 Structural issues 
 
While Norsk Helsenett is a unitary network that individual health organizations 
connect to, the Swedish and Danish counterparts are networks that connect 
networks that health organizations connect to. One lesson from the Norwegian 
project National Health Network/Central Infrastructure, is that each connected 
organization tends to act as a unit and implement protective measures towards 
the outside world. This also holds true for organizations that are (regional) 
health network operators. 
 
The goal of the project was originally to establish a high-bandwidth, high-
reliability core infrastructure that all the regional health networks should 
connect to, in order to establish a national health network. In other words, to 
create a sixth network to interconnect the five that already existed. Not without 
similarities with the current situation in Sweden and Denmark. 
 
The risk of introducing an excessive number of firewalls on any inter-regional 
network path was addressed, and firewalls were acquired in each of the five 
POPs in order to implement a centrally managed protective regime. This regime 
was administered by a group of representatives from each of the regional health 
networks5. One of the group’s tasks was to implement firewalls that would 
protect each of the five regional networks (and their connected institutions) 
from the other four regional networks (and their connected institutions). It 
didn’t work. 
 
When the regional network organizations had their connection to the Central 
Infrastructure installed, they immediately acted to protect their assets by 
installing a regional firewall back-to-back to the POP firewall. Realizing this, 
the POP firewalls were soon disabled, in order to avoid yet another level of 
firewalls on any inter-regional network path. As a consequence, five pairs of 
Cisco PIX-535 firewalls were left to idle, as they became doubly redundant. The 
lesson to be learnt is that the number of organizational boundaries crossed by 
data traffic transmitted between end-systems in two connected health 
institutions should be given careful consideration. 
 
The current interconnect between the national health networks in Scandinavia, 
                                                
5 The Operations & Security group, or DoS group according to its 
Norwegian acronym, managed by the author 
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via the Danish S-DIX, has some unpleasant similarities with the fragmented and 
regionalized infrastructure from the National Health Network period in Norway. 
In particular, the number of firewalls en route for data traffic between two 
hospitals in e.g. Norway and Sweden, and the set of organizations involved in 
their reconfiguration, makes the process of establishing traffic flow very 
complex. A symptom of this (although not odd when ownership of equipment 
etc is taken into account) is the fact that under the current regime, bilateral 
communication between institutions connected to the Swedish and Norwegian 
health networks cannot be configured without involving technical personnel that 
operate the Danish health network. 
 
Figure 25 Path with firewalls between Norwegian and Swedish hospitals 
 
In future editions of a Scandinavian health network, the issue of coordinated 
access control mechanisms should be addressed. Reducing the number of 
firewalls en route between any two connected health institutions to the 
minimum of two (one at each institution’s network connection point) is an 
important goal for practical manageability. However, this does not in principle 
preclude use of centralized, common access control devices like the one 
implemented in the Danish S-DIX, as long as such devices are collapsed 
implementations of aggregated institution specific firewalls, and not an addition. 
 
The question of admission policy in a Scandinavian health network is prudent. 
To what extent should categories of admissible health institution be 
harmonized? Should practitioners outside of the traditional medical branches be 
allowed to connect – chiropractors? acupuncturists? homeopaths? healers? Who 
should decide? And what security requirements should be posed on individual, 
connected institutions? Are there e.g. concepts that could be adopted from the 
established European cooperation on passports and border control, to form a 




The Norwegian Sector Norm [SHdir06] introduces issues related to admission 
policy. It establishes a framework of conformity in the security area that makes 
it possible for Norwegian health institutions to “lower their guard” and 
implement less stringent security measures against other institutions that also 
adhere to the norm. Enforcing the Sector Norm on all institutions connected to 
Norsk Helsenett enables the same “relaxed” security regime in the institutions’ 
health network connection, e.g. by permitting a single security barrier (firewall) 
instead of two barriers in a serial arrangement, as is required when connecting 
to other external networks. 
 
In this perspective an ambition to create a Scandinavian health network with a 
minimum number of security barriers between any pair of health institutions 
may prove to be difficult to implement. The formal trust regime created by the 
Sector Norm may not be easily extendable across borders to other national 
health networks. 
 
6.2 Infrastructure issues 
 
As pointed out in section 2.1.2, use of NAT has a number of negative 
consequences. The requirement to use public IP addresses across the Danish S-
DIX, and the policy to route only public IP addresses in Sjunet in reality 
mandates NAT for most of the data traffic that is carried in these networks. But 
the situation on Norwegian side of the border is also far from ideal. The end-to-
end intention of using private IP addresses in a coordinated regime is being 
severely watered out by address collisions requiring “NAT islands”, both due to 
municipal health units under a local IP addressing regime connecting to the 
health network, and by inter-regional address conflicts dating back to the 
creation of Norsk Helsenett. In summary, the current state of affairs with respect 
to IP address use in the union of the national Scandinavian health networks is 
clearly not ideal.  
 
The obvious solution is to acquire a sufficient number of public IPv4 addresses 
to cover all the hosts and networks involved, and to reconfigure all devices with 
these new, public addresses, and abolish NAT. But in light of the current 
shortage of IP addresses, and RIPE’s restrictive policy in handing out new 
addresses, this is hardly a realistic strategy. In fact, the shortage of IPv4 
addresses is becoming so grave that APNIC has taken an initiative to establish a 
common procedure for all RIRs to terminate their allocation in a timely manner 
[Maemura07].  
 
When this procedure is established, the argument for planning a conversion 
process to IPv6 addresses will become even more convincing. With the creation 
of a registration arrangement to ensure uniqueness of local IPv6 unicast 
addresses (ULA-C) [Martinez07], it is even possible to maintain the single 
desirable feature of the private IPv4 addresses: that they are not routed on the 
public Internet. There is no denying that a renumbering on a scale like this is a 
gigantic undertaking. Infrastructure must be reconfigured, and client systems 
need to be updated and possible replaced. Also, there are also a large number of 
server applications that have been taken into production use in the health sector 
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over the years. The effort required to scrutinize and correct these has a potential 
to dwarf the y2k effort that provided good income for many consulting 
businesses over several years.  
 
Equally significant and related to the IP addressing issue are the problems 
concerning DNS. Use of private IP addresses and NAT mandates a split horizon 
DNS, in which service names resolve into different IP addresses depending on 
where the question originates. In addition, the lack of a common DNS root in 
Norsk Helsenett makes service integration on the DNS level challenging.  
 
It is difficult to see any other solution to the first of these issues than a migration 
to IPv6 addresses, possibly employing ULA-C. This would also enable a full 
integration between the health networks’ internal DNSs and the Internet DNS, 
and making use of the inherent scaling mechanisms in the Internet DNS. This in 
turn would make irrelevant the DNS scaling issues related to a lack of a 
common root in Norsk Helsenett’s DNS. The arguments left for converting to a 
common root are (1) the ability to easily recognize a domain name as health 
related, called the characterizing property of a common root in section 2.2, and 
(2) the possible vanity advantage of a having a ”topical” top level domain name 
like .health. However, if two-letter IS0-3166 country codes were used at the 
second level, then Norwegian health institutions would have their network 
appearances as sub-domains of no.health – clearly a less attractive option. 
 
In fact, converting to IPv6 ULA-C addresses and merging all internal DNS data 
into the Internet DNS will have such positive effects on operational issues in 
Norsk Helsenett, that the effort may be justified even without the prospect of a 
Scandinavian health network cooperation. 
 
In section 4.2 a categorization was made of the requirements that telemedicine 
applications present to a network, as message oriented, interactive or real-time. 
However, an application will not always have intrinsic communication 
requirements that unambiguously fit into one of these categories, but may 
depend on the user interface design philosophy of the application 
developer/programmer, or have properties that utilizes several categories. E.g. 
one can envisage a teleradiology application where interactivity is required for 
RIS access, but transfer of x-rays is done through EDI messages.  
 
One of the fundamental questions is: should the Scandinavian health network 
provide real-time communication services to telemedicine applications that 
include a videoconferencing component, and therefore require service 
guarantees from the network? Credible delivery of such services requires 
implementation of QoS for selected traffic in each of the national networks, as 
well as IP level peering mechanisms between the national network service 
providers that honour these QoS mechanisms for cross-border traffic. 
 
Telemedicine applications that are partly or wholly based on video conferencing 
abound. In fact, one out of four applications presented at the recent conference 
“Cross-border eHealth in the Baltic Sea Region” in Stockholm 
(www.ehealthconference.info) was based on videoconferencing, although 
transported by a network without QoS guarantees. The wide range of 
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telemedicine applications where video conferencing is essential – meetings, 
remote education, medical consultations/second opinion, competence support 
during surgical procedures, telepresence aid for geographically dispersed 
groups, and more – caters for the requirement of any modern health network to 
include service support for real-time traffic as an integrated part of the 
infrastructure.  
 
However, considering the limited amount of experience with QoS provisioning 
in the national health networks in the Scandinavian countries, it may not be 
realistic to put this item on the short-term agenda for a Scandinavian health 
network. Also, the specification of QoS mechanisms between peering network 
providers has been a research topic for several years, although the mechanisms 
necessary to accomplish such arrangements are just now beginning to surface 
from the standardization processes. It may seem that the path towards QoS 
guaranteed network services in a Scandinavian health network is some years 
into the future. 
 
6.3 Motivational issues 
 
At the end of chapter 2, examples were provided of existing and passed cross-
border e-health activities. At the bottom line, the motivation for extending 
health networks across country borders will have to rise from the amount of 
useful applications that can be carried, and the benefits that they bring. But to 
envisage and describe potential applications is no easy task. Besides, there is 
also a chicken-and-egg aspect present: building a cross-border network without 
a sufficiently convincing application portfolio vs. imagining a “killer 
application” without a network available to run it over. 
 
One category of applications that is bound to become important in cross-border 
networking is also exemplified in section 2.6: purchase of diagnostic services. 
The example describes how TMC in Barcelona offers its radiology expertise 
over distance, but in fact Namsos/Levanger had a similar arrangement with 
specialists in Sweden simultaneously. A wide range of telemedicine services 
could be made subject to trade on an international health market, as they many 
places have been for some time on a regional or national basis, motivated by 
lack of qualified personnel in small hospitals, 24-by-7 emergency service 
cooperation etc. 
 
There is also another aspect of the diagnostic service purchase model that 
extends beyond a mass marked. As in many other sectors, the trend towards 
specialization is common in the health area, creating narrow pockets of highly 
specialized skills in centres that operate in a global health market. These centres 
treat rare cases and need large uptake areas, some of which may cross borders. 
Access to this competence will become increasingly important in the process of 




6.4 Further work 
 
Although it proved impossible to execute the performance measurements as 
planned, there is still a general consensus among the involved parties that it 
would still be interesting to conduct these measurements over the S-DIX based 
network. Requests for firewall reconfiguration are still pending, and more 
relevant and valid performance measurements will be conducted when the 
resource situation improves. In the mean time, the experienced TCP window 
and UDP problems on the IxChariot platform should be sorted out. 
 
This thesis work only deals with a narrow set of technical aspects involved in 
building a Scandinavian health network. But the discussion on how these issues 
should be resolved, should be undertaken in a broader forum. Also, many 
important technical issues like carrier technology, QoS regime and security 
solutions are barely mentioned in the present work, and need considerable more 
surveying and discussion. 
 
Other related issues are on the agenda in other contexts. Some legal issues 
concerning cross-border health cooperation are identified and discussed as part 
of the Baltic eHealth project in [Nohr05], as are organizational and financial 
issues [Linstad07]. And several groups and institutions (including MedCom) are 
exploring practical aspects of medical cooperation across national borders, as 
was demonstrated at the ehealthconference.info conference. But there may still 
be issues concerning the formal status and political anchoring of a cooperative 




7 Concluding remarks 
 
There are good reasons for commencing a process of harmonization of the 
infrastructure in the Scandinavian health networks. Employing IPv6, possibly 
with ULA-C addresses, and a DNS fully integrated with the Internet DNS are 
two elements that appear to be necessary for a successful and flexible 
interconnection between the networks. This will re-establish the end-to-end 
principle in the networks, and provide a flexible technological platform for 
further expansion to other regional or national health networks. 
 
The costs associated with such an address migration will obviously be very 
high. But there is also the question: can the cost be avoided? Is the question 
really when a network IP version change should be installed, rather than if? 
Furthermore, there are strong indications that the answer to the when-part of the 
question is soon [Potaroo07]. 
 
Regardless of the outcome of such a harmonization process, closer contact 
between the health network organizations should be considered. The 
Scandinavian countries have had mutual benefits of cooperation in a number of 
areas. Even if the creation of an integrated Scandinavian health network should 
prove to be a premature idea, all parties are likely to benefit from establishing 
closer contact – possibly through an network operations and management 
forum. 
 
On a more general note, the question might be raised: why have 100% of the 
Scandinavian countries established national health networks, when the idea has 
gained so little popularity in the rest of the world? Apart from the traditional 
explanations of well-organized Scandinavian societies, cultural similarities and 
a tradition of looking to each other for good ideas – are there aspects of the 
national health network concept that makes it less suitable in other parts of the 
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